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BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT:
JUDGING HABEAS CORPUS
Noam Biale*

This Article addresses ongoing confusion in federal habeas corpus
doctrine about one of the most elemental concepts in law:
reasonableness. The Supreme Court recently announced a new
standard of reasonableness review for habeas cases, intended to raise
the bar state prisoners must overcome to obtain federal relief. This new
standard demands that errors in state court decisions be so profound
that “no fairminded jurist could disagree” that the result is incorrect.
Scholars have decried the rigid and exacting nature of this standard, but
very little interpretive work has yet been done to theorize what it means
and how it should work. This Article develops a theoretical framework
for understanding the new habeas standard and shows that the
assumptions lower courts are making about its meaning are wrong. It
concludes that federal courts need more data beyond the mere
possibility of fairminded disagreement to find that a decision is
reasonable. The Article draws on scholarship and jurisprudence in
other areas of law that employ reasonableness standards, and argues
that the missing data should be supplied by examining the state
adjudicative process. The case for focusing on state process in federal
habeas cases is not new, but this Article represents the first argument
that the new habeas standard not only permits such a focus but, in fact,
requires it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Here is a story that has become almost commonplace in the news
media: A horrific crime occurs: let’s say a murder. Police arrest a
suspect and the evidence against him seems overwhelming. Perhaps he
has confessed, or an eye-witness identifies him, or his co-defendants
implicate him as the trigger-man. The suspect is tried in state court and
convicted. He is sent to prison; perhaps he is sentenced to death. The
case is closed. Years later, cracks begin to appear in what previously
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looked like a solid conviction. Witnesses recant their statements; the codefendants are revealed as perjurers; the defendant’s lawyer failed to
conduct an adequate investigation of the crime; or the prosecution
withheld exculpatory evidence.1 The defendant presents this new
evidence to the state courts, but they refuse to reopen the case. He files
a last-ditch, hail-Mary petition to the federal court, seeking a writ of
habeas corpus. The federal court faults the state for ignoring the
defendant’s legal claim. It reviews the evidence anew and finds that a
grave injustice occurred. The federal court grants the defendant’s
habeas petition and vacates the conviction or sentence. Though many
years have passed, a wrong is righted.2
Here is a story that is seldom told but, in fact, is much more
commonplace: Another crime; and a different suspect is convicted. She
challenges her conviction and sentence on the same grounds as the
defendant above. The state courts deny relief. The defendant files a
petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The federal court reviews
the state court decision and finds compelling reasons to doubt the
reliability of the defendant’s conviction. However, the federal court
says that the result in the state court is at least debatable, and fairminded
judges could disagree about whether it is correct. The federal court
presumes that the state judges who denied relief were all fairminded.
Therefore, the federal court rules that their decision is not unreasonable,
and denies the defendant’s habeas petition. She remains in prison or,
perhaps, is executed.3
The difference between these two stories is the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Supreme Court’s
1. In the sentencing context, correspondingly, discovery of the defendant’s intellectual
disability might render him ineligible for the death penalty.
2. See, e.g., Death Row Stories: Joe D’Ambrosio (CNN television broadcast Mar. 23, 2014);
Mosi Secret, His Conviction Overturned, Man is Let Out of Prison After 23 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/nyregion/his-conviction-overturned-man-is-let-out-ofprison-after-23-years.html?_r=0;
Paul
House,
THE
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/paul-house (last visited May 30, 2015); see
generally
THE
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited May 30, 2015).
3. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (“This is one of the rare cases in which a habeas petition may well be innocent. . . . The
question of Hawthorne’s innocence, however, is not the one we are encouraged—or, at times, even
allowed—to ask in habeas cases such as this.”); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (declining to decide whether state burden of proof for intellectual disability violates
intellectually disabled petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights where petitioner “failed to show that no
fairminded jurist could agree with the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision about the burden of proof, and
thus this Court is without authority to overturn the reasoned judgment of the State’s highest court.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676–83 (6th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (state court did not unreasonably apply Brady v. Maryland where prosecution withheld witness
statement from defense that asserted that witness had seen victim alive four days after prosecution
alleged defendant killed her).
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interpretation of it. AEDPA restricts state prisoners’ ability to obtain a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court by limiting relief to only those
cases that were “contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or
that involved “an unreasonable determination of the facts” by the state
court.4 Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has interpreted
AEDPA to make “the Great Writ” harder and harder to obtain, despite
the fact that habeas petitions remain the primary vehicle for establishing
claims of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other issues
with serious implications for justice.5 The Court has repeatedly
admonished that only objectively unreasonable state court decisions will
permit federal habeas relief. Some lower courts, however, have resisted
the high deference that the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to
demand. Fed up with a repeat offender, the Ninth Circuit, the Court
recently raised the burden on establishing an “unreasonable application”
under AEDPA, requiring a legal error so extreme that “there is no
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
decision conflicts with th[e] Court’s precedents.”6
This shift in the standard of review appears to raise the bar
considerably for habeas petitioners. Scholars have decried the new
standard as making habeas relief “virtually unattainable.” 7 Little
interpretive work has yet been done, however, to theorize what the
standard could mean and how it should operate. Such theorizing is
necessary and urgent because of troubling interpretations of the standard
occurring in lower courts.
First, some circuit judges have read the Supreme Court’s new gloss
on the statute, announced in the 2011 case, Harrington v. Richter,8 as
shifting the federal court’s focus from the reasonableness of the state
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2014).
5. Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving Forward: A Map for Meaningful Habeas Reform in
Texas Capital Cases, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 214 (2007) (“Most exonerations have come during habeas
corpus proceedings, when lawyers have uncovered evidence of innocence, prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective representation, mistaken identifications, perjured testimony by state witnesses, or unreliable
scientific evidence.”).
6. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
7. Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 55, 56 (2013)
[hereinafter Ritter, Voice of Reason]; accord Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and
the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 1219, 1220 (2015) (“[A]ny participant in our habeas regime would have to agree that it resembles
a twisted labyrinth of deliberately crafted legal obstacles that make it as difficult for habeas petitioners
to succeed in pursuing the Writ as it would be for a Supreme Court Justice to strike out Babe Ruth, Joe
DiMaggio, and Mickey Mantle in succession—even with the Chief Justice calling balls and strikes.”)
[hereinafter Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas].
8. 562 U.S. at 86.
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decision to the reasonableness of the decision-maker. This subjective
test requires federal acquiescence when a presumably fairminded state
judge has already decided that the petitioner’s claims have no merit.
That is problematic, to say the least, because no habeas case will reach
the federal courts unless a state court has already ruled against the
petitioner.
A second reading of the standard treats it as an objective test that may
be conceptualized as follows: in cases where general legal standards are
applied to specific factual scenarios and several possible results may be
correct, the existence of a range of possible results is sufficient to render
the state court decision reasonable. This standard has some intuitive
congruence with objective reasonableness, since a result that is arguably
correct might be said to be ipso facto reasonable. Under this reading of
the standard, federal courts need not look at what the state court actually
did, so long as the ultimate result it reached is at least debatable.
Both of these interpretations are wrong.
An examination of the doctrinal roots of the “fairminded
disagreement” test shows why the subjective reading of the standard is
misguided. Richter9 was the first case in over a decade in which the
Court devoted significant attention to interpreting AEDPA’s
“unreasonable application” clause.
It did so with reference to
disagreement among fairminded jurists, a previously-used, though
dormant, articulation of the statutory standard. This interpretation
was already known to habeas law and had a dubious pedigree.
Following the statute’s enactment, the circuit courts split on whether
AEDPA required a focus on the reasonableness of state court decisions,
or of decision-makers, with some ruling that a mere disagreement
among “fairminded jurists” precluded habeas relief. The Supreme Court
rejected that interpretation of the statute in Williams v. Taylor,10 a 2000
case holding that the state court decision should be assessed based on its
“objective reasonableness,” not whether “all fairminded jurists” would
agree with its result. The Court’s aim was to prevent subjectivism from
creeping into the standard. In Richter, the Court gave no indication that
it was overruling that part of Williams and instead relied on its prior
precedent.11 The subjectivism now creeping into the habeas opinions of
numerous circuit judges applying Richter cannot be squared with a
proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence. Yet
numerous eminent jurists in the Courts of Appeals have, at least
9. I adhere to the convention of referring to habeas cases by the name of the habeas petitioner
even when that party is the respondent in the Supreme Court (as often happens when the case arises
from the Ninth Circuit).
10. 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
11. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101.
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rhetorically, endorsed this subjective version of the standard. As its first
order of business, this Article will put these subjective arguments to rest.
The second reading of the habeas standard, focusing on whether the
state court’s ultimate result is debatable, though more compelling, is
also problematic. Identifying that a range of possible results may exist
does not offer any guidance for determining which of those results is
reasonable. This Article argues that this approach to reasonableness
should be jettisoned in the habeas context for several reasons: First,
treating fairminded disagreement about the merits of a claim as a
sufficient condition for finding the adjudication of that claim reasonable
is, in fact, equivalent to a demand for universal consensus—the
requirement rejected in Williams. Second, the notion that fairminded
disagreement is sufficient to preclude federal habeas relief conflicts
with the purposes of habeas and the structure of AEDPA. Third, this
interpretation of the standard scrambles the elements identified by the
statute, introducing conceptual confusion to the doctrine. Finally, the
Supreme Court’s attempts to limit this standard to legal rules of
“general” application provides hardly any limitation at all given the
types of claims usually raised in habeas. Therefore, contrary to what
Richter suggests, fairminded disagreement, without more, is an
inadequate standard for determining what is reasonable in habeas law.
What more, then, is needed? What additional data do courts need to
determine whether a state decision is reasonable? To answer those
questions, this Article will bring to bear existing scholarship and
jurisprudence from other areas of law that employ objective
reasonableness standards. Constitutional tort law, such as civil rights
suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is especially informative for
habeas jurisprudence because its use of an objective reasonableness
standard mirrors AEDPA’s.12 Of course, § 1983 and habeas law serve
different purposes, and § 1983 jurisprudence is itself far from ideal. But
it provides a useful illustration of this Article’s thesis: federal courts
need more data than simply the result of a state court decision
(sometimes unaccompanied by an opinion) to determine whether that
decision was reasonable. The Supreme Court’s § 1983 cases provide
examples of the additional data that the Court considers in addition to
“fairminded disagreement.” Namely, the Court looks to the process that
government decision-makers go through, including the “step[s] that

12. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Other scholars have noted that this area of
law is “perceived as contiguous to habeas, and hence [is] ripe for doctrinal transplantation.” Aziz Huq,
Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 590 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Habeas &
Roberts]; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First
Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7

1342

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

could reasonably be expected of them”13 and the “division of
functions”14 between them and other institutional actors, in order to
determine whether these decision-makers acted reasonably or not.
Although the Court has not been explicit about what it is doing in the
constitutional tort context, an examination of its cases reveals these
principles at work.
These principles provide a framework for thinking about what
additional data the federal habeas court reviewing a state decision
should examine beyond whether the ultimate result is debatable. Similar
to constitutional tort defendants, state courts similarly go through a
process in adjudicating a habeas petitioner’s federal claims, which
variously may involve appointing an attorney to represent the petitioner
in postconviction proceedings; holding an evidentiary hearing; and
issuing a reasoned opinion explaining why relief is denied. They also
have their own “division of functions” between trial and appellate
courts. Depending on what the state court does, its decision may be
more or less reliable and protective of the petitioner’s federal
constitutional rights. In order to determine whether the state court
adjudication led to a decision that involves a reasonable application of
federal law, therefore, the federal court should look broadly to the state
adjudicative process.
The prescription that federal courts consider state procedures in their
determination whether to grant or deny federal habeas relief is not new.
It has been discussed and supported by scholars with profoundly
divergent views on the desirability of federal review of state criminal
proceedings.15 But this Article is the first to argue that a correct reading
of the new AEDPA standard of review actually requires that the federal
court pay attention to state procedures. It may be unrealistic to
anticipate that the Supreme Court will adopt such an approach with its
13. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. Malley, 475 U.S. at 352–53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456 (1963) (“When should state determinations, subject to direct
Supreme Court review, not be final? I suggest that one answer, at least, fits into the very category we
have been discussing: cases where the state has, in effect, failed itself to provide process. It is, after all,
the essence of the responsibility of the states under the due process clause to furnish a criminal
defendant with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case: the state must
provide a reasoned method of inquiry into relevant questions of fact and law . . . .”) [hereinafter Bator,
Finality]; see also Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254
Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 54–56 (2010) (arguing that focus on process in state
court is “common denominator” between pre-AEDPA critiques of habeas review like Bator’s and
modern commentary critiquing AEDPA’s limitations on habeas review) [hereinafter Marceau, Due
Process]; Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26–33 (2010)
(discussing use of habeas law to make systematic, structural reform to state criminal processes)
[hereinafter Primus, Structural Habeas].
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current ethos of federalism trumping fairness in individual criminal
cases. But the hope is that this Article will provide the groundwork for
a rethinking of habeas for state prisoners, while providing practitioners
with some arguments to use in the meantime when faced with the
fairminded disagreement standard.
This Article therefore has two projects: one descriptive and one
prescriptive. The descriptive project looks at the evolution of habeas
jurisprudence to evaluate the two primary readings of Richter and finds
them both lacking in doctrinal consistency and logical coherence. The
prescriptive portion looks to other areas of law for guidance on what
other factors federal courts should consider in deciding whether a state
court decision is reasonable under AEDPA, and suggests several ways
that guidance ought to bear on habeas adjudication. This Article argues
that the state court process is not only a desirable matter for federal
court consideration, but also a necessary one. That does not mean,
however, that the fairminded disagreement standard stated in Richter is
wrong and can be rejected by habeas petitioners and the lawyers who
represent them. As the standard becomes a fixture in habeas
jurisprudence, petitioners and practitioners ignore it at their peril.
Accordingly, this Article provides a theoretical assessment of the
standard, and argues that there is more leeway inherent in it than
scholars and the courts have so far recognized. This is not an
endorsement, but rather an attempt to reckon with a troublesome reality
of habeas practice.
The Article continues in four parts: Part II will introduce Richter and
then provide background to establish what is at stake and how the
Supreme Court arrived at the fairminded disagreement standard. Part III
will describe the problems that Richter has wrought: the subjective
interpretation of the standard that is appearing in circuit court opinions
and the more plausible, but still flawed, objective interpretation of the
standard. This Part will conclude that federal courts need more than the
mere existence or possibility of fairminded disagreement about a case’s
result to determine whether the state court’s adjudication was
reasonable. Part IV will therefore ask what “more” is needed, and will
argue that federal courts should take additional data from the state
adjudicative process. A focus on process is appropriate because: (1) it is
a background assumption of habeas law in our federal system, (2) it is
consistent with, and in fact, contemplated by AEDPA, and (3) it is how
other areas of law assess reasonableness. This Part will draw lessons
from existing scholarship and jurisprudence in some of these other areas
of law, focusing especially on the use of an objective reasonableness
standard in constitutional tort law. A careful reading of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in that area reveals a process-based framework for
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assessing reasonableness at work. Part V will then apply that
framework to habeas law and suggest some state court procedures and
structures that federal courts should consider in determining whether the
adjudication of a habeas petitioner’s claim is objectively reasonable.
Before plunging into the discussion, a word about terminology: the
cases I will be discussing make reference to agreement among “all
reasonable jurists,” matters about which “fairminded jurists could
disagree,” issues “beyond fairminded disagreement,” and so forth. I
treat these as different expressions of the same standard, though I
recognize that fairmindedness and reasonableness do not necessarily
have the same natural meaning.
II. RICHTER IN CONTEXT: THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE OF THE
FAIRMINDED JURISTS
A. The “Great Writ” and AEDPA: A Brief Background
The “Great Writ” of habeas corpus predates the founding of the
United States and harks back to the principle articulated in the Magna
Carta that “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned . . . except by the
legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”16 The writ
developed in English common law as “a mechanism for securing
compliance with the King’s laws.”17 The Framers incorporated the writ
into the Constitution by supplying limited circumstances for its
suspension (only Congress may do it, and only “when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).18 In our federal
system, habeas has acted as a check on both state and federal sovereign
power, and since 1867 has permitted prisoners to petition a federal court
for relief if either sovereign imprisons them in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States.19 To its proponents,
therefore, robust federal habeas review of state criminal convictions and
sentences represents “‘a double security’” against government
overreach, an example of “the federal system . . . working as it
should.”20
16. Art. 39, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959).
17. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (citing Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White,
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV.
575, 585 (2008)).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); Act of February 5, 1867 (“Habeas Corpus Act of 1867”), § 1, ch
28, 39th Cong., 14 Stat 385, 385–86 (1867).
20. Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How Synergy
Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the Criminal Justice System Nationally, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 298, 299 (2012) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 295 (James Madison) (1788))
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All that past is prologue to a seismic change in habeas corpus law that
occurred late in the 20th Century. Prior to the enactment of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),21 a
prisoner in state custody could petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court and receive de novo review of his federal claims.22 That
standard of review drew vigorous critiques from some of the most
distinguished scholars and jurists in the country, including Professors
Paul Bator and Paul Mishkin, Judge Henry Friendly, and Justice John
Marshall Harlan II, who argued that the criminal justice system’s
interest in finality should trump the prisoner’s interest in endlessly
relitigating claims already passed on by the state court. 23 These calls for
a greater emphasis on finality gained widespread scholarly and judicial
acceptance, and achieved ultimate success with the passage of
AEDPA.24
Although the impetus for AEDPA was a perception in Congress that
the federal death penalty proceeded at too glacial a pace, the statute as
enacted had the greatest significance for state prisoners appealing both
capital and non-capital convictions.25 The statute created procedural
[hereinafter Freedman, Post-Conviction Remedies].
21. S. 735, 104th Cong., 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
15, 18, 22, 28, 49 U.S.C.).
22. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
23. See Bator, Finality, supra note 15, at 453 (“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact
that human institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which leaves well enough
alone and which channels our limited resources of concern toward more productive ends.”); Paul J.
Mishkin, Foreword: the High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 56, 79–80 (1965) (“Even the broadest view of the writ’s functions would not deny that a proper
sentence of a competent court imposed after an unquestionably fair trial is an acceptable justification for
continued imprisonment; the mere possibility, however real, that a new trial might produce a different
result is not a sufficient basis for habeas corpus.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 155 (1970) (“I perceive no general
principle mandating a second round of attacks simply because the alleged error is a ‘constitutional’
one.”); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by
a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.”).
24. See Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2086 (2014) (“History has been kind to Friendly’s proposals.”); accord Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989) (finding criticisms of Bator and Mishkin to be persuasive, and
adopting Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review); see also Alan K. Chen,
Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 535, 548–49 (1999) (discussing Supreme Court’s pre-AEDPA restrictions on habeas
relief).
25. The legislative history of AEDPA has been covered thoroughly in other articles. See, e.g.,
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007)
[hereinafter Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks]; Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(D)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 677 (2003) [hereinafter Ides, Standards]; Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:
Successive Problems in Capital Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002) (noting
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obstacles to federal habeas review, requiring exhaustion of all federal
claims in the state court,26 a strict one-year time limit on filing a federal
petition after the conviction becomes final,27 harsh limitations on filing
successive petitions,28 and onerous requirements for obtaining a
certificate of appealability in order to appeal an adverse decision from a
federal district court.29
In addition to these procedural hurdles, AEDPA amended the
substantive standard of review for the merits of state court decisions,
eliminating de novo review. Section 2254(d) of the statute barred the
federal court from granting the writ unless the petitioner could
demonstrate that the state courts’ adjudication of the merits of his claim
either
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.30
The combination of these procedural and substantive barriers to
habeas relief was met with what Justin Marceau has described as “a vast
expression of fear and loathing.”31 Numerous commentators argued that
various of AEDPA’s provisions were unconstitutional.32 The Supreme
Court disagreed explicitly about the Act’s provisions regarding
successive petitions33 and has applied the substantive provisions without
AEDPA was passed “in an atmosphere of anger and fear” in reaction to Oklahoma City Bombing).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012).
27. Id. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
28. Id. § 2244(b)(1).
29. Id. § 2253(c)(3) (2012).
30. Id. § 2254(d).
31. Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 85, 94 (2012) (citing Professor James Liebman’s remark, “Dwarfed among the many
unspeakable evils that [Timothy] McVeigh wrought is a speakable one . . . , namely, the so-called
[AEDPA]” (alterations in original)) [hereinafter Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process]. Professor
Marceau describes the “fear among scholars and practitioners that AEDPA was effecting a sub rosa,
procedural evisceration of the critical constitutional protections of the Bill of Rights incorporated
against the state by the Warren Court.” Id. at 94–95.
32. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 873–76 (1998)
(arguing that an interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) that would require federal courts to defer to state court
determinations of mixed questions of law and fact would “raise[] at least a serious doubt about the
provision's constitutionality”); see also Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the
Antiterrorism Act’s Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 437 (1998).
33. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that added restrictions which AEDPA
places on successive habeas petitions do not amount to a “suspension” of the writ contrary to Article I,
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expressing any doubt as to their constitutionality. 34 Nonetheless,
criticism of the statute has remained constant,35 especially in the capital
context, where both judges and commentators have argued that
potentially meritorious claims are either barred from review by the
onerous procedural provisions or subject to such an obsequious level of
deference under the substantive standard of review that the Act
perpetuates major miscarriages of justice, including the execution of the
innocent.36 For example, in his 2014 Madison Lecture, Judge William
A. Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit described in detail the case of Kevin
Cooper, a man on California’s death row who, in Judge Fletcher’s view,
was likely framed by the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department.37 After
recounting the wrongdoing of the State in the case, which included
tampering with witnesses, destroying evidence that implicated suspects
other than Cooper, withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense,
and bungling the DNA testing that could have cleared Cooper’s name,
§ 9).
34. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We consider the Court’s
longstanding application of the rules set forth in AEDPA to be strong evidence of the Act’s
constitutionality.”).
35. Besides the justice implications discussed infra, scholars have called the current system of
adjudicating habeas petitions under AEDPA “‘chaos,’ an ‘intellectual disaster area,’ ‘a charade,’ and ‘so
unworkable and perverse that reformers should feel no hesitation about scrapping large chunks of it.’”
Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 1 (quoting Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal
Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542, 553 (2006); Joseph L.
Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
791, 816 (2009); Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002)). Criticism of the
statute has even broken through to the mainstream (if highbrow) media. See Lincoln Caplan, The
Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, THE NEW YORKER, June 21, 2015, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights (“[AEDPA] is surely
one of the worst statutes ever passed by Congress and signed into law by a President.”).
36. See Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (“This is one of the rare cases in which a habeas petitioner may well be innocent. . . . The
question of Hawthorne’s innocence, however, is not the one we are encouraged—or, at times, even
allowed—to ask in habeas cases such as this . . . . [T]he Supreme Court and Congress have shaped
habeas review so that technical errors—typically by prisoners and their counsel—often preclude genuine
inquiry into guilt and innocence.”); accord Stephen R. Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and
How It Grows, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 408–09 (2010) (“[Under AEDPA,] even if the conviction or
sentence is unconstitutional under clearly established Supreme Court law, a state court ruling to the
contrary will not be overturned and the petitioner will remain incarcerated or may be executed, unless
the ruling of the state court was not only wrong, but unreasonably so. Can this really be the law? Is
AEDPA constitutional? Does its limitation of access to the writ of habeas corpus by persons
unconstitutionally sentenced or convicted, including capital defendants, conform with the Framer[]s[’]
purpose of ‘establishing justice’? It would hardly appear to do so.”); Dan Poulson, Note, Suspension for
Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 399 (2008) (arguing that under proper understanding of
Suspension Clause, “AEDPA’s qualitative restrictions on federal habeas review for state prisoners are
plainly unconstitutional”).
37. See Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 581–635 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
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Judge Fletcher stated, “If you have been wondering why Kevin Cooper
is still on death row, the answer is AEDPA.”38
B. Harrington v. Richter
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Richter in 2011
after a decade of repeatedly reversing grants of habeas corpus based, in
the Court’s view, on insufficient deference to the state courts.39 Richter
reflected the Supreme Court’s frustration with lower courts’
(specifically the Ninth Circuit’s) refusal to “respect the limited role” 40 of
the federal court in AEDPA cases.41
In Richter, a prisoner sentenced to life without parole filed a state
habeas petition to the California Supreme Court alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel.42 The state court denied the petition in a onesentence summary order.43 After the federal district court and a panel of
the Ninth Circuit denied the federal habeas petition, the en banc Ninth
Circuit reversed, questioning whether § 2254(d) applied at all to a
summary denial, but holding that the California Supreme Court’s
decision was “unreasonable in any event.”44
Writing for seven justices (Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
judgment and Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration), Justice
Kennedy first considered whether § 2254(d) applied when a state court’s
order was unaccompanied by an opinion stating its reasoning. Justice
Kennedy pointed out that the text of the statute did not require a
statement of reasons; it referred only to a “decision.”45 He added that
every Court of Appeals to consider the issue had held that a written
opinion was not necessary to determining whether the state court’s

38. William A. Fletcher, Our Broken Death Penalty, 89 N.Y.U L. REV. 805, 824 (2014).
39. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the
Supreme Court Through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2165, 2165–68 (2012)
(describing Ninth Circuit’s “strikingly poor” record of reversals before Supreme Court and noting that
its record in cases involving the proper standard of review under AEDPA is “especially troubling”); but
see Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1223 (“To be clear, we [the Ninth Circuit] follow
Supreme Court precedent when we decide habeas cases. What we do not do is attempt to anticipate the
extreme rules that the Court often devises to deny habeas relief to deny habeas relief to persons who
may have been convicted or sentenced unconstitutionally; nor do we adopt those rules before the Court
tells us that we must do so.”).
40. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007).
41. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011) (citing “judicial disregard for the sound and
established principles that inform” proper issuance of writ “inherent in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit”).
42. Id. at 96.
43. Id. (citing In re Richter, No. S082167, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1946 (Mar. 28, 2001)).
44. Id.at 97 (citing Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
45. Id. at 98.
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decision was unreasonable.46 The Court therefore held, “Where a state
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas
petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”47
The Supreme Court’s decision on summary denials was the main
holding of Richter and garnered the most attention.48 But the Court
went further. In explaining how the Ninth Circuit erred in its
adjudication of AEDPA question, the Court cited prior precedent
establishing that § 2254(d)’s “unreasonable application” standard is
“different from an incorrect application.”49 Justice Kennedy then
offered a highly exacting articulation of the standard, saying: “A state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.”50 In case there was any question about the
burden habeas petitioners faced, Justice Kennedy added, “If this
standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As
amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar
on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state
proceedings.”51 He noted that AEDPA “preserves authority to issue the
writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court's
precedents[,]” but, he said, “It goes no further.”52 Later, Justice
Kennedy reiterated, “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a
federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.53
The reference to disagreement among fairminded jurists appeared to
be a reformulation of AEDPA standard by the Supreme Court, though
as we will see in the next sub-part, that interpretation of the
unreasonable application clause was not entirely new to habeas
jurisprudence. To understand how the unreasonable application clause
in the statute came to be defined in terms of fairminded disagreement, it
46. Id. (collecting cases). But see Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered
Questions on AEDPA’s Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469, 478–83 (2012)
(noting this issue was contentiously debated in the circuit courts until a majority reached similar
conclusion) [hereinafter Seligman, Harrington’s Wake].
47. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
48. See generally Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46.
49. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101.
50. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 102.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 103.
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is necessary first to consider the reasonableness standard in the law
generally, and then to examine how it was incorporated into the habeas
context.
C. Reasonableness: The “Familiar” Standard
Standards of reasonableness pervade the law. Reasonableness is hard
to define in the abstract, yet it is commonly used in nearly every legal
arena, from negligence suits in torts, to claims of self-defense in
criminal prosecutions, to the assessment of searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment, the determination of whether a suspect is in
custody under the Fifth Amendment, the efficacy of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment—the list goes on. Reasonableness can, of course, be
either subjective or objective, focusing respectively on either the
particular characteristics of a person and whether she is reasonable (as
Allan Ides has discussed, this really translates to a question of whether
the person is “rational”54); or what a fictitious, anonymous everyman
would do in the same situation.
The latter, objective test has proved much more useful and has been
the touchstone of the common law since the early 19th Century.55 The
objective test is highly flexible: it can be applied to an endless array of
people in an endless array of situations.56 It is also administrable,
allowing judges and juries to assess a defendant’s behavior without
having to peer into her mind. Finally, it is prospective-looking,
protecting defendants from having their actions viewed through the
harsh glare of hindsight. But, as Richard Epstein has pointed out in the
torts context, it is a somewhat “‘higher’ or more demanding” standard
than subjective good faith; “With an objective standard the risk of
[defendant’s] poor intelligence or discretion falls on [the defendant],
while the subjective standard places the risk of [defendant’s] failings on
[the plaintiff.]”57 So the objective standard strikes a balance between
competing interests in backward-looking litigation. That balance is
54. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 689.
55. The rejection of the subjective standard in favor of the objective standard has been black
letter law since the 1830’s English decision Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837)
(arguing subjective standard “would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual”).
56. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173–74
(5th ed. 1984) (“The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior. Yet
the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for
all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature of a
formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The
standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than
the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same
for all persons, since the law can have no favorites.”).
57. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS § 5.3, at 122 (10th Ed., 2012).
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apparently a savory one, since we continue to apply the objective
standard wherever we encounter a thorny legal problem.
In addition, although the objective standard is grounded in the fiction
of a single “reasonable person,” who may stand in for anyone, it does
permit some consideration of personal characteristics as they impact
what a reasonable person would do in the particular circumstances. In
assessing objective reasonableness, “courts . . . may make ‘allowance
not only for external facts, but sometimes for certain characteristics of
the actor himself,’ including physical disability, youth, or advanced
age.”58 In addition to such disabilities, the court may account for
expertise; for example, in a medical malpractice suit, the defendant’s
actions are evaluated based on a standard of what a reasonable doctor
would do when faced with a medical issue,59 not what a reasonable
person would do (presumably, call a doctor). Similarly, for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, an attorney’s decisions are
judged to be reasonable or unreasonable with reference to prevailing
professional norms of legal practice.60 And, as relevant here, a
reasonableness standard that evaluates judicial actions would be a
reasonable jurist test—or, in Professor Ides’s words, a standard of “a
prudent and careful jurist applying professional standards of craft and
competence.”61
D. Objective Reasonableness in Habeas
It is no surprise then, given the ubiquity and flexibility of the
objective reasonableness test, that the Supreme Court would cite the
“familiar” understanding of the standard to interpret the meaning of
“unreasonable application” in AEDPA.62 As we will see, in its first
interpretation of the statute, the Court faced a choice between two
standards—objective reasonableness and error beyond fairminded
disagreement—and opted for the former.
1. Early Interpretations of AEDPA in the Circuits
Following the passage of AEDPA, interpretation of the meaning of
“unreasonable application” quickly produced a circuit split. The
58. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting KEETON,
note 56, § 32, T 174–179).
59. See, e.g., Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 767 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 2002) (“A doctor is charged
with the duty to exercise due care, as measured against the conduct of his or her own peers—the
reasonably prudent doctor standard.”).
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
61. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 688–89.
62. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2010).
ET AL., supra
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Fourth,63 Fifth,64 and Eleventh65 Circuits interpreted “unreasonable
application” to mean a decision that all reasonable jurists would agree is
incorrect.66 In the Fifth Circuit case, Drinkard v. Johnson,67 one
member of the panel dissented from the majority’s holding that the state
court decided the merits of the constitutional claim correctly. The Fifth
Circuit majority noted this disagreement as a basis for concluding that
the state court’s application of the law was not unreasonable. 68 As the
court put it, “[A]n application of law to facts is unreasonable only when
it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be
of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.”69 In other words,
the mere fact of a split among fairminded judges in the Fifth Circuit
panel was held to support the decision to deny habeas relief.
The Third Circuit took a different approach, arguing that the allreasonable-jurists definition “unduly discourage[d] the granting of relief
insofar as it require[d] the federal habeas court to hold that the state
court judges acted in a way that no reasonable jurist would under the
circumstances.”70 The problem with that definition, according to the
Third Circuit, was that it had “a tendency to focus attention on the
reasonableness of the jurists rather than the merits of the decision
63. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir. 1998) (“If no reasonable jurist would disagree
over the applicability of the principle to the new context, then the petitioner will have shown not only
that the decision was ‘contrary to’ clearly established precedent on an understanding of section
2254(d)(1) that analyzes extensions of principle to new contexts under the ‘contrary to’ clause of the
section; he also will have shown that the decision was an ‘unreasonable application of’ clearly
established law on an understanding of the section that analyzes such extension under the ‘unreasonable
application of’ clause. And the writ will issue.”).
64. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e can grant habeas relief only if
a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.”).
65. Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopting Fifth Circuit’s standard).
66. Although not employing the “all reasonable jurists” language, the Seventh Circuit held that
AEDPA greatly increased the amount of deference owed to state courts under the “unreasonable
application” clause. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[AEDPA] tells
federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called
‘unreasonable.’”).
67. Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 770.
68. Id. at 769 (“It follows that when the jurists considering the state court ruling disagree in this
manner, the application of the law by the state court is not unreasonable. The AEDPA therefore bars us
from granting relief to Drinkard on this claim.”).
69. Id.; see also Green v. French, 142 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Drinkard, 97 F.3d
at 751).
70. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). The First
Circuit, by the way, developed yet a third standard, holding that habeas corpus could be granted only if
the state court decision was “so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so
arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes.” O’Brien v.
Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit also twice found an unreasonable
application before Williams, but did not articulate what rendered the state court decision unreasonable,
as opposed to just erroneous. See Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 871-73 (8th Cir. 1999); Long v.
Humphrey, 184 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999).
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itself.”71 To avoid this problem, the Third Circuit held that the
appropriate question was whether the state court’s decision was
“objectively reasonable.”72 The court acknowledged that this standard
would not dictate an obvious result in every case, but argued, “Notions
of reasonableness abound in the law and are not ordinarily considered
problematic, despite their imprecision.”73
2. The Supreme Court Interprets § 2254(d)(1) in Williams
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 2000, when it decided
Williams v. Taylor.74 Petitioner Terry Williams asserted that his trial
counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his capital trial for
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence.75 The federal
district court granted Williams’s petition, finding that the state court’s
rejection of his claim amounted to an unreasonable application of
Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court case establishing that
deficient performance of counsel combined with prejudice to the
defendant constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.76 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that it could not say that
the state court “decided the question by interpreting or applying the
relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable.”77
The Supreme Court produced a fractured opinion reversing the Fourth
Circuit. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court as to the
merits, holding that Williams’s trial counsel was ineffective.78
However, Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court as to the
interpretation of AEDPA’s substantive provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).79 Justice O’Connor’s opinion first attempted to delineate
the respective meanings of § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” and
“unreasonable application” clauses.80 According to Justice O’Connor,
the “contrary to” clause came into play when either (a) the state court
71. Matteo, 171 F.3d at 889.
72. Id. at 889-90.
73. Id. at 891 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (observing, in Fourth
Amendment context, that “the test of reasonableness . . . is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application”)).
74. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
75. Id. at 370.
76. See 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
77. Williams, 529 U.S. at 374 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir. 1998))
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 390-99 (Op. of Stevens, J.).
79. Id. at 402-13 (Op. of O’Connor, J.).
80. Id. at 404. She criticized Justice Stevens for failing to give the two clauses independent
meaning.
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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on
a question of law, or (b) if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent
and arrives at a result opposite to the Court.81 By contrast, Congress’s
inclusion of the “unreasonable application” language suggested that
when a state court correctly identifies the governing legal rule and then
applies it to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case, the task of the
federal court under AEDPA is to determine whether that application was
“unreasonable.”82
Justice O’Connor then turned to the meaning of “unreasonable” under
the statute. She noted the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a state court
decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law “only if the state court has applied federal law ‘in a manner
that reasonable jurists would agree is unreasonable,’”83 but she held,
“The placement of this additional overlay on the ‘unreasonable
application’ clause was erroneous.”84 Instead, “a federal habeas court
making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the
state court’s application of clearly established law was objectively
unreasonable.”85 Responding to the “all reasonable jurists” test, Justice
O’Connor added:
The federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a
subjective one by resting its determination . . . on the simple fact
that at least one of the Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant
federal law in the same manner the state court did in the habeas
petitioner’s case. The “all reasonable jurists” standard would tend
to mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on a
subjective inquiry rather than an objective one.86
As an example of a federal habeas court so misled, Justice O’Connor

81. Id. at 405.
82. Id. at 407–08. In this respect, Justice O’Connor held that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation
of the “unreasonable application” clause was correct. Id.
83. Id. at 409 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 409–10. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O’Connor that the “all reasonable jurists”
test was an erroneous interpretation of the unreasonable application clause, and his opinion provided
further explanation of the problems with such a test. See id. at 377–78 (Op. of Stevens., J.) (“[T]he
statute says nothing about ‘reasonable judges,’ presumably because all, or virtually all, such judges
occasionally commit error; they make decisions that in retrospect may be characterized as
‘unreasonable.’ Indeed, it is most unlikely that Congress would deliberately impose such a requirement
of unanimity on federal judges. As Congress is acutely aware, reasonable lawyers and lawgivers
regularly disagree with one another. Congress surely did not intend that the views of one such judge
who might think that relief is not warranted in a particular case should always have greater weight than
the contrary, considered judgment of several other reasonable judges.”).
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disapprovingly cited the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Drinkard that a state
court’s application of federal law could not be unreasonable because the
Court of Appeals panel split 2–1 on the underlying constitutional
question.87
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that “[t]he term
‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define,” but she said, “it is a
common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are
familiar with its meaning.”88 Justice O’Connor then defined what an
unreasonable application of federal law is not: merely an incorrect
application of federal law.89
Williams left the increment of incorrectness beyond error necessary to
overcome AEDPA’s bar to relief unexplained, however. This prompted
head-scratching from judges attempting to apply AEDPA’s substantive
provisions in light of Williams. Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second
Circuit remarked that Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the
unreasonable application clause was “virtually tautological,” directing
courts to grant the writ where the state court decision was not merely
erroneous but also unreasonable.90 He added that “the increment [of
incorrectness beyond error] need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief
would be limited to state court decisions so off the mark as to suggest
judicial incompetence.”91
Despite the “common,” “familiar” understanding of objective
reasonableness, the rule of Williams proved easy to state but hard to
apply. In Andrade v. Attorney General of the State of California, for
example, the Ninth Circuit determined that the state court committed
“clear error,”92 a standard that, according to its own precedent, occupied
a middle ground between the poles suggested by Judge Newman.93 The
Supreme Court rejected the “clear error” formulation as “not the same”
as objective unreasonableness.94 As a semantic matter, that was of
course true, but the Court provided virtually no analysis to explain what
the substantive difference between the two standards was, instead
repeating that Williams required a denial of the writ unless the state
court’s application of law was objectively unreasonable (and finding the

87. Id. at 410.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. 270 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
93. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We believe that the clear
error standard occupies the middle ground that the Williams Court marked out when it rejected the
arguments of those who contended that an independent determination of prejudicial error by a federal
court was sufficient and of those who argued for the overly deferential ‘reasonable jurists’ standard.”).
94. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.
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state courts’ decision not so).95
Scholars and courts were therefore left to muddle through how to
apply the objective reasonableness standard. The leading habeas treatise
noted that all three opinions in Williams, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent, established that under both clauses of § 2254(d)(1),
the federal court must review not only the ultimate judgment of the state
court but also its reasoning.96 Moreover, it added, “In sharp contrast to
some of the preexisting lower court caselaw, which had read section
2254(d)(1) to require virtually abject ‘deference’ to state court
judgments, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion . . . noticeably steered
clear of any use of the term ‘deference.’”97
Although the Court did not further elucidate the AEDPA standard
explicitly, it did apply it in a manner consistent with the approach taken
in Williams in subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel cases. In
Wiggins v. Smith, the Court faulted the state court for assuming that the
petitioner’s trial attorneys’ mitigation investigation was adequate instead
of considering whether their decision to cease investigating after
receiving a presentence report and social services records demonstrated
reasonable professional judgment.98 In Rompilla v. Beard, the defense
attorneys failed to examine the defendant’s prior conviction file, which
would have informed them about a wealth of mitigation evidence and
also prepared them to defend against the State’s use of the prior
conviction as aggravation. The Court went through that evidence,
painstakingly explaining why it mattered to Rompilla’s ineffective
assistance claim, and held that “the conclusion of the state court fails to
answer the considerations we have set out, to the point of being an
objectively unreasonable conclusion.”99 And, in Porter v. McCollum,
the Court held that the state court’s finding that the petitioner could not
establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim was unreasonable because the state court “either did not consider
or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the
postconviction hearing.”100 In all these cases, the Supreme Court looked
at what the state court actually did in adjudicating the case, faulted it for
overlooking some material fact or element of applicable law, and found
that omission to be unreasonable.101
95. Id. at 76–77. See also Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 741-48 (criticizing the Court for
making “absolutely no effort to get beneath the skin of the Ninth Circuit standard”).
96. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 32.3, at 1809 (6th ed. 2011).
97. Id. at 1832.
98. 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003).
99. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005).
100. 558 U.S. 30, 42–43 (2009).
101. See also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) (analyzing, post-Richter, state
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The assumption following Williams, therefore, was that while the
Supreme Court had raised the standard from de novo review, the new
“unreasonable application” standard was by no means insurmountable
and simply required an analysis of what the state court had actually
done, to determine whether the steps it took were objectively reasonable
or not.102
3. Interregnum: Yarborough v. Alvarado
Although the fairminded jurists appeared to be banished to the
netherworld of rejected standards in Williams, they reemerged briefly in
a 2004 case in which Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in a 5–4
opinion103 reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of the writ. In Yarborough
v. Alvarado, Alvarado was a seventeen-year-old accused of helping a
co-defendant steal a truck, a scheme that led to the murder of the truck’s
owner (by the co-defendant). Alvarado was taken in for questioning and
confessed.104 The issue before the state courts was whether he was in
custody at the time of the confession. The California courts concluded
that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person in Alvarado’s
situation would have felt free to leave. On federal habeas, the Ninth
Circuit held that the state courts were unreasonable to ignore Alvarado’s
youth in determining the custody question, and that this amounted to an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court because “the relevance of juvenile
status in Supreme Court caselaw as a whole compelled the ‘extension of
the principle that juvenile status is relevant’ to . . . custody
determinations.”105
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was questionable on the “clearly
established law” prong of the § 2254(d)(1) analysis since the Supreme
Court at that time had not held that age was relevant to the custody
inquiry.106 The Circuit seemed to recognize as much when it
court’s adjudication of ineffective assistance of counsel claim and finding that state court’s failure to
apply the correct test was contrary to clearly established law).
102. Some scholars argued that after Williams, the AEDPA standard really made no difference in
the rate of success for habeas petitioners at all, and that the statute was all “hype” and no” bite. John H.
Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006). But see Marceau,
Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31, at 100–05 (results of empirical analysis showing that,
reviewing a broader sample of Supreme Court cases, evidence now suggests, contrary to Professor
Blume, that “AEDPA’s bite has become severe”).
103. Justice O’Connor joined the opinion, but wrote separately to express an additional reason
that the writ should not be granted. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 669 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. at 658.
105. Id. at 660 (quoting Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)).
106. It later did in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7

1358

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

characterized the rule as an “extension” of the Supreme Court’s caselaw.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “if a habeas court must
extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,” then it likely
was not “clearly established at the time of the state-court decision,”107
and, in this case, the Court’s precedent had not established that age was
a mandatory consideration.108
On the “unreasonable application” question, the Court repeated the
refrain from Williams that “’unreasonable’ is ‘a common term in the
legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its
meaning.’”109 Justice Kennedy then added, without citation to any
controlling habeas precedent,110 “At the same time, the range of
reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant
rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow.”111 By
contrast, he stated, “[o]ther rules are more general, and their meaning
must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general
standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of
judgment.”112 Justice Kennedy then stated, “Ignoring the deferential
standard of § 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can be said that fairminded
jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.” 113 This
statement seems abstruse in the context of a discussion of the
unreasonable application clause. Why ignore the standard when you are
applying it? Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy concluded that there were
facts supporting both sides of the custody question, and therefore stated
for the Court, “These differing indications lead us to hold that the state
court’s application of our custody standard was reasonable.”114
Judith Ritter has argued that the use of the “fairminded jurists could
disagree” formulation in Alvarado was dictum because (a) there was no
need to apply the unreasonable application bar because the Court

107. The Court left some ambiguity in this rule, noting that “the difference between applying a
rule and extending it is not always clear.” Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666. But see White v. Woodall, 134 S.
Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (“‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at
hand,’ then by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state-court
decision.’” (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666) (emphasis added)).
108. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666–67.
109. Id. at 663-65.
110. Justice Kennedy cited his own concurrence in a pre-AEDPA habeas case, Wright v. West,
explaining that in the Teague context, “[w]hether the prisoner seeks the application of an old rule in a
novel setting depends in large part on the nature of the rule. If the rule in question is one which of
necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific
applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new rule.” 505 U.S. 277, 308–09
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted)).
111. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 665.
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essentially said the state court’s decision was correct even under de novo
review; and (b) the Court’s remark that it was “[i]gnoring the deferential
standard of § 2254(d)(1)” suggests that it “disassociated its reference to
fair-minded jurists from the unreasonable application clause.”115 Justice
Kennedy’s phrase is “puzzling,”116 for at least two other reasons: First,
as just mentioned, the Court in Alvarado also ruled that there was not
clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court on the
relevance of Alvarado’s youth. Therefore, the entire unreasonable
application analysis may be said to be dicta. Second, as Ritter also
notes,117 Alvarado did not suggest that it was overturning that part of
Williams that rejected the fairminded disagreement standard, or that
fairminded disagreement was in any way the new test courts should use
to assess the unreasonable application clause.118 Instead, it cited
Williams as the controlling standard.
Alvarado’s use of the fairminded disagreement standard accordingly
might have faded into juridical oblivion. But, as will be seen, dicta in
Supreme Court opinions often operate by the Chekovian rule of drama
that pistols left hanging on walls must eventually be fired. 119
4. Alvarado Redux in Richter
In Richter, Justice Kennedy cited Alvarado to reconfigure the habeas
standard, stating: “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”120 The
internal quotes signaled the Court’s citation to Alvarado’s statement,
“Ignoring the deferential standard of § 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can
be said that fairminded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado
was in custody.” Of course, the Court had dropped the “[i]gnoring the
deferential standard” portion of the sentence. The Court went on to
describe § 2254(d)’s barrier to relief as involving a “no fairminded jurist
could disagree” test several more times in the opinion, saying,
“[AEDPA] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is
no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s

115. Ritter, Voice of Reason, supra note 7, at 66–67.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 67.
118. Justice O’Connor apparently did not see any inconsistency with her opinion in Williams as
she joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion.
119. DONALD RAYFIELD, ANTON CHEKOV: A LIFE 203 (1998) (“If in Act I you have a pistol
hanging on the wall, then it must fire in the last act.”).
120. 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)).
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decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. It goes no farther,”121
and, “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”122 Again, the Supreme Court
did not suggest that it was overruling Williams—it relied on it. But
Justice Kennedy’s statement of the standard worked a metamorphosis on
the caselaw, reviving the fairminded jurists test from its doctrinal torpor.
The Alvarado pistol had been fired.
III. WHAT RICHTER HAS WROUGHT: CONFUSION AND CONSTERNATION
IN THE COURTS AND SCHOLARSHIP
Following the passage of AEDPA and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Williams, scholars debated how the “unreasonable application” clause
should be interpreted and struggled to develop a workable standard for
adjudicating habeas cases.123 Following Richter, however, scholars have
not yet grappled with the meaning of the fairminded disagreement
standard, beyond a forming consensus that the new standard makes
habeas relief harder to obtain—perhaps catastrophically so. Professor
Ritter has described the Richter standard as “dangerous and improper”
and has argued, “Far more than deference, this test requires
acquiescence.”124 Professor Marceau has called it “one of the most
uncharitable standards of review known to law.”125 Others have
described it as “super-deferential,”126 “completely untethered from
Supreme Court precedent,”127 and, even more dramatically, “an
unworkable . . . standard that fundamentally contradicts American
common law decision-making.”128
121. Id.
122. Id. at 102; see also id. (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or
theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.”).
123. See, e.g., Ides, Standards, supra note 25; Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New
Tolerance for “Reasonably Erroneous” Applications of Federal, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 792–93 (2002);
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32; Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 381 (1996).
124. Ritter, Voice of Reason, supra note 7, at 77, 86.
125. Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31, at 97.
126. Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance Requires Earlier
Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 110, 115 (2012).
127. Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1228.
128. Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement About Disagreement: The Effect of a Circuit Split or “Other
Circuit” Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief for State Convicts, 82 U. CIN. L. REV.
831, 857 (2014) [hereinafter Moyer, Circuit Splits].
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The impact of the new standard in the Supreme Court appears to bear
out these fears. Since Richter, the Court has cited the fairminded jurists
test in numerous cases as the standard a petitioner must meet to
surmount § 2254(d)’s barriers to relief.129 As of this writing, habeas
petitioners have lost every one of those cases. That is not a particularly
persuasive piece of evidence, however, since the Court has rarely sided
with the habeas petitioner since Williams,130 and, due to AEDPA’s
procedural barriers, a prisoner has many ways to lose.
A more informative and nuanced picture of the standard emerges
upon examination of the reactions in the lower courts. Because habeas
decisions make up such a substantial proportion of federal dockets, I
limit my exploration to circuit decisions. Such decisions are rarer—and
the calls are generally closer—because of the barriers AEDPA erected to
obtaining a certificate of appealability.131 The two primary responses to
Richter in the circuit courts have been a recapitulation of the subjective
standard rejected in Williams, and an objective standard that focuses
solely on the ultimate result of the state court decision. This Article now
turns to these two interpretations.
A. The Subjective View
The subjective view, expressed in some circuit court opinions, reads
Richter as not just elevating AEDPA standard, but as changing it
fundamentally to something that looks remarkably unlike objective
reasonableness. Take, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in a
2012 case, Peak v. Webb. The two judges in the majority, Danny Boggs
and Gilbert Merritt, each issued opinions explaining their view that

129. Davis v. Ayala, No. 13-1428, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 18, 2015); Woods v. Donald, 135 S.
Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (per curiam); White v. Woodall, 134 C. St. 1697, 1702–03 (2014); Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (applied in § 2254(d)(2) context); Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992
(2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.
2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam); Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) (per curiam); Bobby
v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) (per curiam); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011).
Ironically, a case decided the same day as Richter, also reversing a habeas grant on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim (and also written by Justice Kennedy), did not mention the fairminded
disagreement standard. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011).
130. But see Brumfield v. Cain, No. 13-1433 (U.S. June 18, 2015); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376 (2012); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Notably, in both Brumfield and Lafler, the only of these cases
decided after Richter, the Court did not cite the fairminded disagreement test, though that may be
because neither case was decided on the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1). The
dissents in both cases, however, emphasized the Richter standard. See Brumfield, slip op. at 20-21
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1396 (Scalia, J., dissenting).. For a full scorecard of postAEDPA Supreme Court habeas decisions, see Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31.
131. See infra notes 174–76.
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Richter raised the bar to habeas relief higher than the plain language of
AEDPA or its prior interpretation in Williams.132 Judge Boggs further
held that “[t]hough the trial court may well have violated Peak’s
constitutional rights . . . we cannot say, as the Supreme Court now
requires, that fairminded jurists could not disagree with our opinion . . . .
In fact, four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court
did disagree. Therefore, we are compelled to affirm.”133 In other words,
the mere existence of disagreement—among presumably fairminded
judges—was dispositive. In dissent, Judge Eric Clay argued that by
deferring to the sum of state court judges who agreed with the trial
court, “[t]he majority erroneously defers to the Kentucky Supreme Court
justices’ status as state court judges, rather than their legal analysis.” 134
In other cases, where panels have decided to grant the writ, judges
have dissented by pointing, like Judge Boggs, to the number of state
judges who denied relief to a habeas petitioner. Tallying these state
court judges, they have stated, as Judge Richard Tallman of the Ninth
Circuit did (with sarcastic understatement), “Presumably at least some
of them were ‘fairminded jurists.’”135 Likewise, in a recent dissent from
a panel’s grant of habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit wrote: “[T]he
majority’s decision runs up against the striking fact that before today, no
court had ever found that the conduct of [petitioner]’s counsel resulted
in constitutional prejudice. . . . [T]he majority has reached the
remarkable conclusion that every single judge to have previously
considered this issue has been unreasonable.”136 The Ninth Circuit
majority in the case involving Judge Tallman responded like Judge
Clay, arguing that under AEDPA, “The emphasis is clearly on
application of law rather than on counting noses.”137
132. 673 F.3d 465, 473–74 n.12 (6th Cir. 2012); id. at 474 (Merritt, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 467 (Op. of Boggs., J.); accord id. at 473–74 (“It is not unreasonable to believe, as did
at least three justices on the Kentucky Supreme Court, as well as the trial-court judge, that confrontation
only requires that a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to call during
his own case.”).
134. Id. at 487 (Clay, J., dissenting). Judge Clay also argued that no case before or after Richter
suggested that the Supreme Court was doing away with or otherwise amending the “objective
reasonableness” standard from Williams, and, accordingly, the “fairminded jurists” test should be treated
as equivalent to the Williams standard. Id. (Clay, J., dissenting). “[G]iven the number of AEDPA cases
decided by the Supreme Court in recent years,” Judge Clay argued, “it is safe to assume that had the
Supreme Court sought to raise the Williams level of deference to be given to state court judgments, it
would have said so.” Id. at 486-87 (Clay, J., dissenting).
135. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) (Tallman, J., dissenting); accord Amado
v. Gonzalez, 734 F.3d 936, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc,
758 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2014) (Rawlinson J., dissenting) (“I agree with the presumably fairminded
district court that the state court did not unreasonably apply Brady.”).
136. Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
137. Doody, 649 F.3d at 1007 n.6 (internal citation omitted). Just before the publication of this
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Similarly, circuit judges have begun to cite the agreement of federal
judges with the state courts as proof-positive that the state decision
cannot be deemed unreasonable. In Young v. Conway, a recent
(unsuccessful) effort at en banc review of a panel decision granting the
writ, Judge Reena Raggi of the Second Circuit pointed to the split
among state court judges on the issue, tallying ten state court judges—
six New York Court of Appeals judges, three Appellate Division judges,
and the trial judge—who voted against the petitioner versus three who
voted in his favor.138 “In such circumstances,” she wrote, “the fact that
the panel shares the minority view is not enough to denominate the
majority view ‘unreasonable.’”139 Moreover, Judge Raggi added, she
and the two other circuit judges who joined her dissent agreed with the
state courts—a fact that, in her view, should compel a finding that their
decision was within the range of reasonable disagreement.140 Echoing
Judge Raggi’s reliance on a split among federal judges, Judge Thomas
Hardiman of the Third Circuit recently wrote:
The existence of a circuit split demonstrates that it is wrong to
conclude that fairminded jurists could [not] disagree on the
correctness of the state court’s decision in this case. . . . The mere
fact of a difference of opinion among courts of appeals leads
ineluctably to the conclusion that a state court cannot run afoul of
AEDPA regardless of which of these two paths it chooses.141
What is apparent from these opinions is that federal judges have
begun to cite the reasonableness of the decision-makers, as opposed to
the decision, as grounds to deny habeas relief. 142 Of course, these
Article, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Ayala, reversing yet another Ninth Circuit habeas grant,
involving the application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In the Court’s opinion, Justice
Alito engaged in the very rhetorical practice of nose-counting described here, stating: “In this case, the
conscientious trial judge determined that the strikes at issue were not based on race, and his judgment
was entitled to great weight. On appeal, five justices of the California Supreme Court carefully
evaluated the record and found no basis to reverse. A Federal District Judge denied habeas relief, but a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and found that the California Supreme
Court had rendered a decision with which no fairminded jurist could agree.” Ayala, No. 13-1428, slip
op. at 29 (June 18, 2015).
138. 715 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (Raggi, J., dissenting from denial of en banc).
139. Id.; accord id. at 102 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“Even though ten state court
judges . . . concluded that the record satisfied Wade’s independent-source requirement, the panel
inexplicably holds that such a conclusion is an unreasonable application of federal law and not one upon
which ‘fairminded jurists could disagree.’” (internal citation omitted)).
140. Id. at 95–96 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (arguing that judge writing for majority “plainly disagrees
with [Richter]’s strict standard of unreasonableness, concerned that few, if any, habeas cases will satisfy
it”).
141. Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 416 (3d Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Hardiman,
J., dissenting).
142. The Supreme Court’s use of the word “fairminded” as opposed to “reasonable” in describing
the jurists is significant here as it tends to invite an examination of the jurist’s mind, rather than what she
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opinions do not rely exclusively on the fairmindedness of the state court
judges—the federal judges quoted above make the case that their state
court counterparts correctly adjudicated the merits. So the counting of
noses may simply be overheated rhetoric. Moreover, the number of
close cases in which such rhetoric might make a difference to the result
will likely be small, since the Williams “objective reasonableness”
threshold is already difficult to overcome.143 But we can imagine a case
where it would make a difference: where the state court’s decision
involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
yet the federal court denies relief based on a presumption that the state
court judge herself was nonetheless fairminded. Further, even if these
subjective arguments amount to a mere “linguistic shift,” 144 they are
significant because they reinforce the notion that Richter made the
habeas standard more exacting—and thereby made the writ harder to
obtain. No one wants to accuse a fellow jurist of lacking a personal
characteristic necessary for judging,145 so judicial rhetoric may, in fact,
matter in close cases. The Richter standard consequently increases the
discursive stakes of finding a state court decision unreasonable, and
concomitantly increases the discomfort of granting habeas relief. Far
easier simply to say: some judges think one thing; others think
something else; all are fairminded—petition denied.146
But, as should be clear from the historical discussion above, the
subjective view cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s habeas
doctrine. Like Alvarado, Richter nowhere suggested that it was
overturning that part of Williams that rejected the Fourth Circuit’s “all
fairminded jurists” test.147 No justice remarked on the change to the
actually does to adjudicate the claim.
143. See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011) (reviewing meager success
rate of non-capital habeas petitions post-AEDPA but prior to Richter).
144. Huq, Habeas & Roberts, supra note 12, at 539.
145. There are, of course, counterexamples but they reveal how charged the rhetoric sometimes
becomes in these cases. In granting habeas relief to a prisoner he found to be actually innocent, Judge
Nicholas Garaufis of the Eastern District of New York cited the “wrongdoing” committed by “the
incomprehensible [state court judge], who so regrettably failed time and time again to give meaningful
consideration to the host of powerful arguments [petitioner] presented to her.” Lopez v. Miller, 915 F.
Supp. 2d 373, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
146. Similarly in the field of journalism, critics have contended that reporters may feel compelled
simply to present both sides of story in order to achieve “balance,” rather than investigate who is telling
the truth. See, e.g., Brent Cunningham, Re-thinking Objectivity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July-Aug
2003), http://www.cjr.org/feature/rethinking_objectivity.php?page=all. In this way, the quest for
objectivity can actually lead to a form of relativism. The subjectivism that is creeping into some circuit
opinions applying the fairminded disagreement test in habeas cases risks creating a similar form of
judicial relativism, where the mere fact of differing opinions requires judges to throw up their hands,
ignore the legal questions presented by the case, and simply rule against the petitioner.
147. To the contrary, it cited Williams twice as the governing standard. Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011). See also Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1228 (noting that
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standard a separate opinion (though Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in
the judgment indicated that she found Richter’s claim non-meritorious,
suggesting that she disapproved of the Court’s attempt to raise
AEDPA’s bar).148 Accordingly, whatever the Richter standard means, it
cannot be the subjective “all fairminded jurists” test that was rejected in
Williams. The “subjective view”—applying deference to state court
judges’ status as judges—therefore does not square with habeas
doctrine. The Supreme Court has firmly rejected that standard and has
given no indication that it intended to overrule Williams. Accordingly,
the practice of “counting noses” that some circuit judges have engaged
in since Richter is wrong.
B. The Objective, “Ultimate Result” View
In rejecting the subjective view of the fairminded disagreement
standard, some judges and scholars have argued that Richter did not
alter the Williams standard at all, and that fairminded disagreement is
just another way of saying objective reasonableness. 149 I think that this
is an overly optimistic view of what the Court was doing in Richter. In
both tone and substance, Justice Kennedy’s opinion plainly meant to
raise the threshold for obtaining habeas relief. The question therefore
becomes: what does an objective fairminded disagreement standard
mean, and when should it be applied?
First, it should be noted that, like objective reasonableness, the
fairminded disagreement standard appears in multiples areas of law.
“Beyond fairminded disagreement” or “beyond fairminded debate” is a
standard sometimes used in plain error review,150 Federal Rule of Civil
the tension with Williams “did not seem to bother the Court, as it acknowledged no shift in its approach
to AEDPA review despite the fact that it adopted nearly the same test it had previously rejected”).
148. See id. at 113-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The strong force of the prosecution’s
case . . . was not significantly reduced by the affidavits offered in support of Richter’s habeas petition. I
would therefore not rank counsel’s lapse so serious as to deprive [Richter] of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. For that reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment.” (alteration in original) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
149. The argument that Richter did not alter the objective reasonableness standard from Williams
has been made by judges and advocates alike. See Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 486 (2012) (Clay, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “fairminded jurists” test should be treated as equivalent to Williams standard);
Br. for Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers Supporting Respondent, at 19-20, White v.
Woodal,
134
S.
Ct.
1697
(2014)
(No.
12-794),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12794_resp_amcu_nacdl.authcheckdam.pdf (cert petition by Professors Marceau and Lee Kovarsky noting
warden’s reliance on split circuit panel to argue that reasonable jurists could disagree on merits issue,
and arguing, “Whatever ‘fair-minded disagreement’ means, it cannot mean a return of the ‘allreasonable-jurists’ scenario unless this Court meant to overrule, sub silencio, the statutory interpretation
in Williams.”).
150. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
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Procedure 50(b) motions for judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict,151
and patent infringement cases.152 As Professor Ides has discussed, it is
really a standard of “rational” disagreement, insofar as “a court will
uphold an actor’s choice so long as the choice remains within the
permissible range of alternatives and can be deemed to have been a
rational choice among those alternatives.”153
Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Alvarado and Richter have similarly
framed the application of the standard as depending on the range of
permissible results. “The more general the rule,” he stated in both cases,
“‘the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.’”154 Both Richter and Alvarado involved such general
rules, in Justice Kennedy’s view, because both of the underlying rules
(ineffective assistance of counsel and custody) themselves turn on
standards of reasonableness. Accordingly, courts might construe the
standard as applying only when there is a general legal standard applied
to the facts of a case, where multiple results could plausibly be
correct.155 In such a case, the existence of multiple plausibly correct
results would be sufficient to render the state court’s decision reasonable
and preclude habeas relief.156
This formulation is intuitively congruent with objective
reasonableness analysis: if two options are plausibly correct resolutions
of the merits of a claim, then either one is ipso facto reasonable. It also
supports a mode of adjudicating habeas petitions that some scholars
have called an “ultimate result” approach,157 whereby the federal court
does not consider any of the actual steps the state court took in
adjudicating the claim; instead it merely looks at the ultimate result of
the state court’s decision and asks whether that result is at least arguably
151. See, e.g., The Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Pub. Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 81-1188-MA,
1984 WL 478431, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 5, 1985), aff’d 756 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1985).
152. See, e.g., Fargo Elec., Inc. v. Iris Ltd., Inc., No. 04-1017 JRT/FLN, 2005 WL 3241851, at *4
(D. Minn. Nov. 30, 2005).
153. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 689.
154. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alavarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004)).
155. This limitation was endorsed in an early scholarly assessment of Williams. See Pettys, supra
note 123, at 792-93 (arguing that reasonableness should be determined based on whether the applicable
federal law “appears in the form” of a rule or standard).
156. Ironically, this is remarkably similar to the “clear error” standard. See Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). Recall, however, that the
Court rejected that standard as insufficiently deferential in Andrade, see discussion at note 94, supra.
157. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., Charles v. Stephens, No. 13-9639 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2014) (petition by
Professor Kovarsky arguing that the ultimate result approach misapplies Richter). The debate about
whether AEDPA requires deference to state court opinions or state court results in fact predates Richter.
See Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should
AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1511 (2001).
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correct. Since Richter, some courts have adopted this approach and
framed it as a two-step inquiry: First, the federal court must “’determine
what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the
state court’s decision.’”158 Second, the court asks “whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme]
Court.”159 In other words, as Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second
Circuit recently explained (derisively), the federal court is meant to
“imagine what reasons the state court might have had for its
conclusion[,]” and, if those “imagined reasons . . . are not so incorrect
under Supreme Court holdings that [the court] could not imagine ‘fairminded jurists’ would approve of them,” habeas relief must be denied.160
Although the first step of the “ultimate result” approach contemplates
looking at “what arguments or theories supported” the state court
decision, this inquiry is unnecessary if the federal court can imagine a
reasonable theory to support the result. Whether or not the state court
mentions that reasonable theory is irrelevant. As the Eighth Circuit
recently put it, “Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there
often is more than one way to resolve an appeal, and not every possible
approach makes it into an opinion.”161 So, to summarize the approach:
where the state court applies a “general” legal rule, the possibility of
reasonable disagreement on the correct ultimate result is sufficient to
preclude a finding that the state court was unreasonable.
All of this sounds quite consistent with objective reasonableness, but
closer examination reveals numerous flaws with the debatable ultimate
result approach, including: (1) framing the test as a sufficient condition
158. Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 102 (2011)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The omission of the original language in
Richter, “or, as here, could have supported” removes what may be interpreted as a limitation on
Richter’s reach, cabining the decision to apply only to state decisions issued without a reasoned opinion.
See Pet. for Writ of Cert., Charles v. Stephens, No. 13-9639, at 18–19 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2014). Since
Richter, however, the circuits have split on whether the opinion’s “could have supported” language for
decisions unaccompanied by a reasoned opinion applies to decisions that do include a reasoned opinion.
Compare Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 241 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We review only the ultimate legal
determination by the state court—not every link in its reasoning.”); Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825,
832–33, 837 (8th Cir. 2012) (“As we understand Richter and Moore, the Court's opinions were premised
on the text of § 2254(d) and the meaning of ‘decision’ and ‘unreasonable application,’ not on
speculation about whether the state court actually had in mind reasons that were ‘reasonable’ when it
denied relief.”) with Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding Richter is
limited to summary denials and that the federal court may “look through” state high court’s summary
denial to evaluate reasoning of a lower court in denying claim); Johnson v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 643
F.3d 907, 930 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The Court's instruction from [Richter] does not apply here because
the Florida Supreme Court did provide an explanation of its decision . . . .”); Sussman v. Jenkins, 642
F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
159. Eley, 712 F.3d at 846 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Hawthorne, 695 F.3d at 199 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
161. Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d at 837.
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for the denial of habeas relief is actually equivalent to the standard
rejected in Williams; (2) the test cannot be reconciled with the operation
of habeas in a federal system because granting the writ will always
require disagreement about the merits; (3) the test adds unnecessary
confusion to the framework of AEDPA; (4) the test scrambles the
elements of § 2254(d)(1); and (5) the purported limitation on the test’s
application is illusory.
1. The Fairminded Disagreement Test is Logically Equivalent to
the Rejected All-Fairminded Jurists Test
In order for the fairminded disagreement test to be consistent with
Williams, it must fall somewhere within the spectrum of standards that
Williams permitted. We know that the lower end of the spectrum is a
judgment that the state court decision is simply erroneous. That is not
sufficient for habeas relief. On the high end, we know that Williams
requires less than universal consensus among all fairminded jurists,
since that was the rejected Fourth Circuit standard. Richter’s
fairminded jurists test must be somewhere in between these poles. As
just discussed, Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the standard in
Alvarado and Richter supposes that fairminded disagreement about the
merits of the claim is merely a sufficient condition for the state court
decision to be reasonable, while not requiring universal consensus.
Reduced to a logical proposition, the assumption is:
Possibility of fairminded disagreement → Reasonable result
(Or, If fairminded disagreement is possible, then the result is
reasonable.)
The sufficient condition implies the necessary inverse: the
reasonableness of the result is a necessary condition for fairminded
jurists to disagree about it. No problems with this formulation so far.
However, if we assume the truth of the formulation above, then the
contrapositive is also true:
¬ reasonable result → ¬ possibility of fairminded disagreement
(Or, if the result is unreasonable, then there is no possibility of
fairminded disagreement.)
Again, the sufficient condition—here an unreasonable result—implies
the necessary inverse: No possibility of fairminded disagreement is a
necessary condition for an unreasonable result. But this is precisely the
outcome that the Williams Court rejected: Universal consensus cannot
be a necessary condition for the federal court to find an unreasonable
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application of federal law.162 Although the Richter standard sounds
much more modest—merely permitting fairminded disagreement as a
sufficient condition for a reasonable decision—it is logically equivalent
to the universal consensus standard forsworn in Williams. Accordingly,
fairminded disagreement, without more, cannot be a sufficient condition
for the state court decision to be reasonable.
2. The Fairminded Disagreement Test is Inconsistent with the
Federal Structure of Habeas
The notion that fairminded disagreement about the result is sufficient
to preclude habeas relief is also inconsistent with the structure of habeas
review in our federal system. Although Justice O’Connor famously
called a habeas decision announcing the Supreme Court’s strict
procedural default “a case about federalism,”163 habeas doctrine has had
a federalism component for only about 150 years (a relative blip in its
eight-century history). As Eve Brensike Primus has detailed, the
Reconstruction Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, in the
same term that it passed the Fourteenth Amendment and created federal
question and removal jurisdiction, in order to provide oversight for state
courts thought to be systematically violating federal civil rights.164 As
Professor Primus explains, “federal habeas review of state court
criminal convictions was not only about emancipating wrongly
convicted individuals; it was also about coercing reluctant states to
enforce federal rights.”165 Thus, federal review of state courts’ failures
to protect liberty is an underlying assumption of habeas corpus in our
federal system, an assumption AEDPA left unchanged.166
162. One way of distinguishing these two tests is that Justice O’Connor criticized the Fourth
Circuit’s Green test as permitting granting the writ only when the state court applied federal law “in a
manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409
(2000) (emphasis added), as opposed to the Richter test that the writ could not be granted if “fairminded
jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). There could be a difference in this distinction, as
Justice O’Connor pointed out, the Green formulation requires an “additional overlay” of reasonableness
review. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. But Green and the case it cited, the now-familiar Drinkard, both
made clear that “‘an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable
jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.’” Green
v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.
1996)). Thus, as a doctrinal matter, the two tests have not been distinguished on the basis of correctness
vs. reasonableness.
163. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
164. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 13-14; see also generally ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988).
165. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 14.
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has long recognized, and AEDPA
codified, an exhaustion requirement, whereby state prisoners must pass
through “one complete round” of the state’s appellate procedure in order
for the federal court to consider the merits of their claims. 167 Although
exhaustion is not jurisdictional (and can be waived by the State),
according to Lee Kovarsky, courts often treat it as though it is.168
Consequently, except under certain narrow circumstances,169 no prisoner
will have the merits of his federal claims considered by a federal court
until a state court has already reviewed them. And the prisoner will
have no need to petition the federal court for review of those claims
unless the state court has already rejected them.
This means that no habeas petitioner comes to federal court without
the prior existence of disagreement about the merits of his constitutional
claims. Such disagreement, on its own, cannot be sufficient for the
denial of habeas relief, or habeas would become a nullity in a federal
system. As Judge Clay put it in his dissent in Peak, the fairminded
disagreement standard threatens to make AEDPA’s threshold for relief
“impossible to meet, as no habeas claim would reach our Court unless a
jurist presumed to be fairminded had not already once decided the issue
against the defendant.”170 Judge Barrington Parker of the Second
Circuit sounded a similar alarm responding to Judge Raggi’s dissent
from denial of en banc in Young v. Conway, writing, “If [Judge Raggi’s
view] is correct, then habeas relief would never be available since the
writ, by its nature, requires federal courts to, in the appropriate case,
disagree with state judges on matters of federal law.”171 This is not
jurisdictions . . . [if a state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.”).
167. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Exhaustion was a Court-created requirement long before the enactment of AEDPA. See Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210 n.30 (1950); see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-500 (1974)
(federal courts restrained in issuing injunctions that would interrupt ongoing state criminal
prosecutions); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). But see Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 804 (1965) (arguing for
removal of state prosecutions for conduct protected by federal constitutional guarantees of civil rights
under federal removal jurisdiction and habeas corpus jurisdiction).
168. Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 452.
169. Scholars have noted a possible opening in the Supreme Court’s recent cases that would
permit de novo review of federal claims when a claim is procedurally defaulted, but that default is
occasioned by ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. See Marceau, supra note 24, at 2143
(“Specifically, when, because of the errors of postconviction counsel, a claim is not fully developed in
state court proceedings, Martinez permits the prisoner to: (a) overcome the procedural default; and (b)
avoid the strictures of § 2254(d) and, therefore, Richter and Pinholster.”).
170. Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 487 (6th Cir. 2012).
171. Young v. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (Parker, J., concurring in the denial of en
banc). Judge Reinhardt makes the same point in his recent article, The Demise of Habeas Corpus, supra
note 7, at 1229.
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simply a reductio ad absurdum argument that the Supreme Court cannot
have intended to eliminate federal habeas relief altogether.172 The
Court, in fact, does not have the power to do so—only Congress has the
constitutional authority to suspend the writ.173 The federal structure of
habeas corpus review therefore suggests that more is needed beyond the
possibility of disagreement on the merits for the federal court to
determine that the state court’s adjudication of the claim was reasonable.
3. The Fairminded Disagreement Test Adds Confusion to the
AEDPA Framework

The notion that fairminded disagreement on the merits is sufficient
for denial of the writ also adds confusion to AEDPA framework
because it duplicates a similar standard meant to create a low
threshold for appellate review of habeas decisions. AEDPA requires
that habeas petitioners obtain a “certificate of appealability” before
appealing an adverse decision from the federal district court to the Court
of Appeals.174 The Supreme Court has held that the required showing
for a certificate of appealability to issue is whether the petitioner can
“demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 175 But
debate among reasonable jurists about the merits of the claim also
requires dismissal of the petition under the fairminded disagreement
standard. The granting of a certificate of appealability therefore
presupposes an affirmance of the denial of habeas relief on the merits.
District Judge Brian Cogan of the Eastern District of New York has
written about this tension, calling the certificate of appealability
standard and the Richter standard “hard to reconcile,” and adding, “The
only possible means of reconciliation requires the conclusion that there
must be some space between a district court’s review of a state court
decision and the notional review of that district court’s decision by
‘jurists of reason,’ however slight that space may be.”176
Arguably these standards can be reconciled, since disagreement
172. Though the Court also made clear in Richter that it was not doing so. See Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a
complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves
authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the
state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents.” (emphases added)).
173. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2).
175. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Anthoulis v. New York, No. 12 Civ. 6253(BMC), 2013 WL 5726154, at *8 n.3 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 21, 2013), aff’d 586 F. App’x 790 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Samuel v. LaValley, No. 12 Civ.
2372(BMC), 2013 WL 550688, at *12 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2013) (using the same language).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

35

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7

1372

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

about whether a state court decision is correct might preclude habeas,
but debate about whether that disagreement is reasonable could be
grounds for a certificate of appealability. In other words, the “space”
between the two standards is the extent to which an issue may be
debatably debatable. While this reconciliation of the standards is
(perhaps) theoretically coherent, however, courts will likely face
increasing difficulty in applying these multiple layers of abstraction.
Thus, the fairminded disagreement standard adds further confusion to
an already complex statutory framework.
4. The Test Scrambles the Elements of § 2254(d)(1)
A further problem with Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the objective
fairminded disagreement test is that it scrambles the “unreasonable
application” and “clearly established Federal law” clauses of
§ 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has suggested, and at least one
scholar has urged, that the existence of judicial disagreement about a
point of law may be relevant to the question of whether that point of law
is clearly established for AEDPA purposes.177 If the legal rule invoked
is highly general, then its impact on a specific, new factual scenario may
not be clearly established.178 Justice Kennedy’s characterizations of
“general standard[s]” in Richter and Alvarado, which can only be
unreasonably applied if the application is beyond fairminded
disagreement, imports this requirement of specificity from the “clearly
established Federal law” clause into the “unreasonable application”
clause. Importantly, this makes a factor that may be relevant in the
former dispositive in the latter.179
Moreover, if only prior cases with highly specific factual similarity to
the habeas petitioner’s case can provide grounds for relief, the
“unreasonable application” clause starts to collapse into the “contrary
to” clause, permitting relief only when “the state court confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]
precedent.”180 The collapsing of these two distinct avenues to habeas
relief under AEDPA is something that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in

177. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006); Moyer, Circuit Splits, supra note 128, at
857–58 (noting that invocation of “reasonable jurists” test has created confusion about whether a circuit
split determines that there is no clearly established Federal law on point).
178. But see Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings of Supreme
Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 759 (2010) (inveighing against this point).
179. See Moyer, Circuit Splits, supra note 128, at 866–67 (arguing reasonable jurist test should be
scrapped, but that existence of circuit split should be relevant to “unreasonable application” analysis).
180. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
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Williams attempted to prevent.181 Justice Kennedy’s opinions thus
create substantial conceptual confusion that the Court has already taken
pains to clear up.
5. Cabining the Test to “General” Legal Rules is Illusory
Finally, Justice Kennedy placed a purported limitation on the
application of the objective fairminded disagreement test: only applying
when the legal rule in question is a general standard. But within the
context of the typical merits claims in habeas cases, this is virtually no
limitation at all. The kinds of claims that are usually brought in habeas,
especially ineffective assistance of counsel, involve multiple layers of
reasonableness review and prejudice inquiries that make them highly
fact-specific.182 The materiality component of prosecutorial misconduct
claims similarly is a general standard that requires a fact-specific
inquiry in case-by-case determinations.183 Even most trial error that
involves the application of more formalistic legal rules is by and large
subject to harmless error analysis that makes these legal rules operate
like general standards.184 With very few exceptions, state appellate
courts will be applying general standards to the facts of a case, so the
leeway Justice Kennedy imagines in these cases—and the attendant
problems just described—will feature across the board.185
IV. THE “MORE” THAT UNREASONABLENESS REQUIRES: RETURNING
PROCESS TO THE AEDPA ANALYSIS
For all the reasons described so far—doctrinal reasons, reasons of
logic, reasons of federalism, and reasons of practicability—
disagreement among fairminded jurists, without more, is insufficient to
find a state court decision reasonable under AEDPA. The question,
then, is what more is needed? What additional data should federal
courts examine to determine whether a decision is reasonable or not?
This Article will now argue that the process of adjudication in the state
court provides that additional data. By “process of adjudication,” I
181. Id. at 407.
182. See generally Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
183. Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
184. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman As the Maurice
A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403,
405–06 (Winter 2004) (noting these and other rules that have adopted results-oriented prejudice inquiry
that “often boils down to whether the appellate judges think that the prosecution’s evidence of guilt was
potent and the sentence well deserved”).
185. Habeas law also has its own built-in harmlessness analysis after one surmounts the
substantive barriers of § 2254(d). See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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mean everything including the funding and appointment of defense
counsel, the structure of state appellate review, the decision whether to
hold an evidentiary hearing, the explanation of a decision in a reasoned
opinion, and more. The next Part will discuss the possible applications
of a process-oriented framework. But first, it is necessary to defend the
focus on process. I do so on several grounds: the scholarly consensus
that such a focus is warranted; the consistency between a focus on
process with habeas law and, perhaps surprisingly, AEDPA itself; and,
finally, coherence with other areas of law, especially the law of
constitutional torts.
A. Process as an Underlying Theoretical Assumption to Habeas
Debates
The notion that state adjudicative processes should be considered as
part of federal habeas review is not new. Arguments for doing so have
extended back to early critiques of the de novo standard in federal
habeas cases. Professor Bator’s famous broadside against the Warren
Court’s habeas jurisprudence assumed that the states must provide fair
process in order for their decisions to be respected on federal habeas.186
This idea is enjoying a resurgence among scholars who, though
vehemently disagreeing with Bator on the favorability of federal review,
point to the state postconviction process as the best opportunity for
habeas petitioners to develop their federal constitutional claims.187
Indeed, as Professor Marceau has discussed, a requirement of “full and
fair” state procedures is the common denominator between arguments
against expansive habeas jurisdiction and contemporary critiques of
AEDPA.188 So the idea of robust, fair state procedures is an underlying
theoretical assumption of multiple views supporting a greater or lesser
role for federal courts in collateral proceedings.
B. Consistency with Habeas Law and AEDPA
Further, although the idea that federal courts may scrutinize state
186. Bator, Finality, supra note 15, at 456–57.
187. See, e.g., Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473 (2013);
Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31; Lee Kovarsky, Maples and Martinez: Gideon for
State
Postconviction,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(Oct.
2,
2011),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/maples-v-thomas-and-martinez-v-ryan-gideon-inthe-state-post-conviction-era.html; Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46, at 499–500. Notably,
as Professor Kovarsky has pointed out elsewhere, a standard of review that assessed arbitrary process
rather than unreasonable application of federal law was promoted (and ultimately rejected) for years
prior to the passage of AEDPA. Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 459–65.
188. Marceau, Due Process, supra note 15, at 54–56.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/7

38

Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement: Judging Habeas Corpus

2015]

BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

1375

procedures may seem anachronistic in the contemporary AEDPA era of
federalism and comity, there is nothing inherently inconsistent about
deferring to state court decisions while still encouraging particular
procedures through the application of deference when states follow
those procedures. The Supreme Court in fact endorsed such a view in
Teague v. Lane, recognizing that one of the purposes of federal habeas
corpus review is to incentivize state courts to “conduct their proceedings
in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards.”189
AEDPA itself also contemplates the federal courts creating such
incentives for the states by permitting an expedited federal habeas
deadline for states that could establish that they had provided qualified,
competent, adequately resourced, and adequately compensated postconviction counsel in capital cases.190 The statute also permits
petitioners to circumvent the exhaustion requirements when “there is an
absence of available State corrective process” or “circumstances exist
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights” of the
petitioner.191 The inclusion of these provisions in AEDPA reveals a
system where federal courts can incentivize more robust state process to
protect the rights of defendants consistently with the Act’s federalism
and comity purposes.192
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized, in applying
AEDPA, that state adjudicative process affects the outcome of
claims.
In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Court canvassed the
procedural history of petitioner’s claim that his mental illness
prohibited the State from carrying out the death penalty.193 Citing
numerous irregularities in the state court’s adjudication of

189. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality op.) (quoting Desist v. U.S., 394 U.S.
244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While Teague was decided
prior to the enactment of AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1)’s “clearly established law” requirement has been
thought to have codified Teague. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) (pl. op. of Stevens,
J.); but see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (rejecting analogy between AEDPA and Teague
and noting that retroactivity rules that govern federal habeas review on the merits are “quite separate
from the relitigation bar imposed under AEDPA”).
190. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2265 (2012). AEDPA confers responsibility for determining
whether the states were eligible for such expedited procedures to the federal courts. However, the USA
Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 2261, 120 Stat. 192, 250
(2006), amended the statute to shift the eligibility determination from the courts to the Attorney General.
This expedited deadline is not without controversy. Habeas litigators in California have challenged (as
of this writing successfully) a rule shifting the ability to provide an expedited deadline from the federal
courts to the Attorney General. See Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517
CW, 2014 WL 3908220 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
192. I ascribe these purposes to AEDPA cavalierly, acknowledging that doing so has been
thoroughly questioned by Professor Kovarsky. See generally Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note
25.
193. 551 U.S. 930, 938–42 (2007).
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petitioner’s claim, the Court held that the state court failed to provide
procedures adequate to ensure that an execution could be carried out
consistently with Ford v. Wainwright, which held that the Eighth
Amendment bars the execution of the insane.194 The Court stated:
The state court’s failure to provide the procedures mandated by
Ford constituted an unreasonable application of clearly
established law as determined by this Court. It is uncontested
that petitioner made a substantial showing of incompetency.
This showing entitled him to, among other things, an adequate
means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in
response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state
court. And it is clear from the record that the state court reached
its competency determination after failing to provide petitioner
with this process, notwithstanding counsel’s sustained effort,
diligence, and compliance with court orders. As a result of this
error, our review of petitioner’s underlying incompetency claim
is unencumbered by the deference AEDPA normally requires.195
Consequently, the Court concluded that the state court’s process
itself abrogated the deferential structure of AEDPA, and it proceeded
to analyze petitioner’s mental illness claim de novo.196 An
examination of state process is thus fully consistent with existing
habeas jurisprudence.
C. Coherence with Other Areas of Law
Finally, a focus on state adjudicative process in federal habeas is
consistent with the reasonableness analysis that courts undertake in
other areas of law. I do not think there is anything inherently
controversial about looking to other areas of law for the meaning of
ambiguous terms, but if the project needs further support, habeas
doctrine provides it: Williams’ citation to the “common,” “familiar”
nature of the objective reasonableness standard suggests that it is
entirely appropriate to look to other areas of law for the meaning of the
standard in the habeas context.
In tort law, fact-finders look at how a particular decision was reached,
whether reasonable precautions were taken, or whether any risks of error

194. Id. at 948 (internal citation omitted).
195. Id.
196. The Court also noted that the fact that the Ford standard was stated in general terms did not
make its application reasonable, since AEDPA “recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be
applied in an unreasonable manner.” Id. at 953.
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were unreasonable.197 Jurists and scholars have long debated how to
undertake this analysis,198 the most famous suggestion being the Hand
Formula199, but the reasonableness of a particular act or decision is not
usually analyzed in a factual vacuum. To the contrary, the process of
arriving at that act or decision provides the context in which the
objective reasonableness of the actor’s behavior can be assessed.
Another example (frequently seen in habeas cases) is the law
governing ineffective assistance of counsel. Since there are myriad
ways to try a case, the Supreme Court has declined to create any
substantive checklist for what constitutes effective representation.200
Instead, as in the torts context, the Court has repeatedly looked to what
counsel actually did to determine whether a reasonable attorney in
counsel’s position would have done the same—whether counsel
terminated an investigation at a reasonable point,201 failed to examine
evidence that was available and likely to be used in the prosecution’s
case,202 or failed to request funds to which the defendant was entitled in
order to hire an expert.203 These are all examples of looking at the steps
an actor took (and did not take) to determine the reasonableness of his or
her decisions; a procedural solution to a substantive quandary.
Perhaps the most informative area of law that employs an objective
reasonableness test is the law of constitutional torts. This is because ,
first, constitutional tort law has also historically used a standard of
objective reasonableness that refers to the range of judgment that
would govern the decisions of a reasonably competent decisionmaker; and, second, its structure—involving reasonable or
197. See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, § 5.16 (“The fundamental postulate of the law of negligence is
that [a defendant] is responsible only for the unreasonable risks created by his conduct.”); Kenneth W.
Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1995)
(discussing requirement that people take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents, even when they
are not proximate cause). The reasonable precaution/risk of error balancing test bears similarities with
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test for due process. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
198. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323
(2012); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and
Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668 (2010); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 813 (2001); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311 (1996); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139
(1996); Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
677 (1985); see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
199. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.).
200. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (“More specific guidelines are not appropriate.
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying particular requirements of effective
assistance.”).
201. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003).
202. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 384 (2005).
203. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014).
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unreasonable applications of clearly established law—parallels
AEDPA’s. I do not mean to suggest that the law of constitutional torts
should be imported into habeas doctrine wholesale or that these two
doctrines are equivalent. Habeas and constitutional tort law serve
significantly different purposes. Also, efforts to interpret AEDPA
standard by reference to constitutional tort law have been met with
skepticism from courts.204 Nor do I mean to hold up constitutional tort
law as ideal—civil rights scholars would likely shudder at the
suggestion that the Supreme Court’s doctrine in this area is a model of
clarity or fairness.205 But even if not exemplary, constitutional tort law
can be informative for our purposes, so I will briefly describe its focus
on process for assessing reasonableness.
D. Process as Reasonableness: Constitutional Torts
The Civil Rights Act of 1861, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, permits
civil actions for deprivation of rights by officials acting “under color of”
law. The Supreme Court has long recognized a qualified immunity
defense for those officials who violate rights, but act in good faith.206
The purpose of qualified immunity is to balance the vindication and
protection of citizens’ constitutional rights on the one hand, with the
need to have law enforcement officials perform their duties without
excessive fear of personal liability on the other.207 While the good faith
test for qualified immunity initially employed by the Court contained
both subjective and objective elements, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,208 the
Court limited the availability of qualified immunity to an objective
204. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.12 (Op. of Stevens, J.) (rejecting notion that
Court should treat “clearly established law” as meaning the same thing under AEDPA and constitutional
tort law, since the two areas are “doctrinally district”). See also Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,
1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting comparison between reasonableness in habeas and qualified immunity
law as a “faux analogue[]” because, unlike a court’s review of government officers’ actions under
§ 1983, “our review of state court decisions under AEDPA is not constrained because the state courts’
functions are somehow more discretionary than ours, or because they must be more vigorous in the
discharge of their duties”); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting different
purposes).
205. For a small sampling of the vast literature criticizing qualified immunity doctrine, see Karen
Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope
Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L.
REV. 117 (2009); Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9
NEV. L.J. 185 (2008); Diana Hassel, Living A Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123
(1999); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1997); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187 (1993).
206. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974).
207. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–68 (1992).
208. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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inquiry: “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”209 Harlow and
subsequent cases210 established a two part test for analyzing qualified
immunity: (1) was a constitutional right violated? and (2) was the right
clearly established such that a reasonable officer would know he was
violating it?
The Harlow test has remained the standard for qualified immunity
since that decision. However, in some cases, the Court has put a
“reasonably competent officer” gloss on the standard, akin to the
fairminded jurists test. In Malley v. Briggs,211 for example, the Court
faced a claim for qualified immunity where a police officer had
presented arrest warrants to a magistrate, had the warrants signed, and
then relied on the warrants in conducting an arrest.212 The warrants
were found to be unsupported by probable cause. Nevertheless, the
officer claimed entitlement to absolute immunity or, in the alternative, to
qualified immunity on the basis that seeking a warrant from a neutral
magistrate was per se objectively reasonable.213 The Court rejected the
notion that absolute immunity was required to protect officers stating,
“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”214 The Court then articulated what the qualified
immunity standard was that would be applied in that case: “Defendants
will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant
should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
this issue, immunity should be recognized.”215 The Court elaborated on

209. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
210. E.g. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
211. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
212. Id. at 338.
213. Id. at 339, 345.
214. Id. at 341.
215. Id. (emphasis added). The Court confusingly did not stick to its modified standard even
within the Malley decision: when it actually applied the qualified immunity test, it reverted back to the
familiar Harlow standard. The Court first rejected the officer’s argument that seeking the warrants was
per se objectively reasonable. Then the Court stated the qualified immunity question to be “whether a
reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” Id. at 345 (footnote
omitted). More confusing still, the actual question of whether the officer in Malley was entitled to
qualified immunity under the Harlow standard was not before the Court, and it declined to answer it.
See id. at 345 n.8 (“The question is not presented to us, nor do we decide, whether petitioner's conduct
in this case was in fact objectively reasonable. That issue must be resolved on remand.”).
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why it was applying a seemingly more deferential, “reasonably
competent officer” standard, based on the respective roles of the police
officer and magistrate who approved the warrant:
[I]t goes without saying that where a magistrate acts mistakenly in
issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence
of a magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be
held liable. But it is different if no officer of reasonable
competence would have requested the warrant, i.e., his request is
outside the range of the professional competence expected of an
officer. If the magistrate issues the warrant in such a case, his
action is not just a reasonable mistake, but an unacceptable error
indicating gross incompetence or neglect of duty. The officer then
cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater
incompetence of the magistrate.216
Because the magistrate has greater expertise in law, an officer might
be excused for relying on the magistrate’s mistake—unless the error was
so obvious that no reasonably competent officer would think there was
probable cause to support the warrant application.
That was a theme picked up on by Justice Powell in his partial
concurrence/partial dissent. Justice Powell noted that the majority’s
opinion did not foreclose some consideration of the fact that a neutral
magistrate had approved the warrant, despite the “little evidentiary
weight” the Court seemed to afford it.217 He was concerned that the
majority opinion “denigrate[d] the relevance of the judge’s
determination of probable cause and his role in the issuance of the
warrant” and in so doing, misconstrued the respective roles of the police
officer and the magistrate or judicial officer. 218 Justice Powell cited
longstanding precedent recognizing the “division of functions” between
police and magistrate, and argued that the police should be encouraged
to submit affidavits to judicial officers.219 Therefore, he would have
held that where an officer goes through “the essential checkpoint
between the Government and the citizen,”220 and applies to a neutral
magistrate for a warrant, that fact should be given substantial
evidentiary weight.
Although Justice Powell’s opinion did not carry the day, it has fared
better with time. In recent years, the Court has given substantial weight
to officers’ passing through “the essential checkpoint” of a neutral
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 346 n.9.
Id. at 350–51 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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magistrate. In Messerschmidt v. Millender,221 a 2012 case involving a
warrant that was approved but turned out to be overbroad, the defendant
officers’ process in applying for the warrant and the division of
functions between themselves and other actors played significant roles
in the Court’s finding their conduct reasonable. The Court cited the fact
that the officers had obtained approval of superiors, an assistant district
attorney, and the neutral magistrate in obtaining the warrant. Therefore,
the Court held (quoting Malley), it could not be said that “no officer of
reasonable competence would have requested the warrant,” because that
would mean not only that the defendant officers were plainly
incompetent, “but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and
the magistrate were as well.”222 Instead, by going through the process of
applying for and obtaining the warrant, the officers “took every
reasonable step that could be expected of them.”223 As a result, the
Court concluded that the defendant officers’ actions were not “entirely
unreasonable”224 (the qualifier suggesting a higher threshold for
overcoming qualified immunity than run-of-the-mill objective
unreasonableness).
These cases show that, within its objective reasonableness analysis,
the Court has been willing to apply a more exacting “reasonably
competent officer” test in cases where defendant officers go through the
steps of obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate—even where the
warrant turns out to be defective. Central to these cases is the officers’
process and the division of functions between the executive official and
the neutral judicial actor.
A few theories might support the application of a higher standard in
these cases. First, taking these steps protects citizens’ constitutional
rights ex ante, so the balance that qualified immunity seeks to strike is
already weighted in favor of constitutional protection (hence the
rebuttable presumption that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant

221. 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
222. Id. at 1249–50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id. at 1249. This holding was roundly criticized by both the partial concurrence (Justice
Kagan) and dissent (Justice Sotomayor) as inconsistent with Malley’s requirement that the officers not
simply rely on the approval of the magistrate, but instead exercise their own independent judgment
about the lawfulness of the warrant. Id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id.
at 1259–60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The majority dismissed this criticism, saying, “by holding in
Malley that a magistrate's approval does not automatically render an officer’s conduct reasonable, we
did not suggest that approval by a magistrate or review by others is irrelevant to the objective
reasonableness of the officers’ determination that the warrant was valid.” Id. at 1249-50. This reading
of Malley channels Justice Powell’s point in his partial concurrence that the Court did not exclude the
fact that the officer sought a warrant from consideration.
224. Id. at 1246, 1249 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard, taken
from the exclusionary rule context, see U.S. v. Leon, 460 U.S. 897, 923 (1984), was, before
Messerschmidt, entirely unprecedented in Supreme Court § 1983 caselaw.
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complies with the Fourth Amendment). Second, applying greater
deference to practices that are not constitutionally required in all cases,
yet are preferred, incentivizes those practices. Third, a heightened
standard of review in such cases does not upset the balance qualified
immunity is intended to achieve because the Court has created a
backstop for especially egregious or obvious errors.225
I do not want to oversell the utility of the Supreme Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence for our purposes. The Court itself has not
always been explicit or consistent about when it is applying a
“reasonably competent officer” standard.226 Further, its use of this
language has caused significant confusion in the lower courts, leading
several circuits to adopt a version of this standard, dubbed “arguable
probable cause,” not just in cases where officers take extra precautions,
but across the board.227 Several circuit judges have criticized the
standard, including then-judge Sonia Sotomayor, who described it as
giving government defendants a “second bite at the immunity apple”
and for taking “courts outside their traditional domain, asking them to
speculate as to the range of views that reasonable law enforcement
officers might hold, rather than engaging them in the objective
reasonableness determination that courts are well-equipped to make.”228

225. In Groh v. Ramirez, the defendant officers obtained a search warrant, but the places to be
searched and the items to be seized were conspicuously absent from the warrant. 540 U.S. 551, 554
(2004). The Supreme Court held that such a warrant was plainly invalid. It rejected the defendant
agent’s argument that, despite its invalidity, the search was nevertheless reasonable because the
magistrate had authorized the search on the basis of adequate probable cause contained in the
application. The Court held that “the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search
as ‘warrantless’ within the meaning of our case law.” Id. at 558. The Court went on to deny qualified
immunity because “even a cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a simple glance—
would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have known was
constitutionally fatal.” Id. at 564. Thus, the Court has set a limit on what should be considered
“reasonable competence” in the qualified immunity context.
226. In fact, no Supreme Court majority opinion has repeated Malley’s specific invocation of
reasonable disagreement.
227. See Tal J. Lifshitz, Note, “Arguable Probable Cause”: An Unwarranted Approach to
Qualified Immunity, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1178 (2011) (citing cases from the First, Second, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits employing an “arguable probable cause” standard). Other
scholars have noted that the Eleventh Circuit has been especially aggressive in applying the “arguable
probable cause” standard to render officials immune from suit, calling it “the circuit of ‘unqualified
immunity.’” Brown, supra note 205, at 207 n.196 (quoting Elizabeth J. Norman et al., Statutory Civil
Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1556 (2002)).
228. Walcyzk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accord
McColley v. Cnty of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 830–31 (2d Cir. 2014) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(criticizing arguable probable cause standard for creating “a nimbus of protection around probable
cause, which allows officers to make objectively unreasonable probable cause determinations so long as
the officer themselves are reasonably competent”); see also Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d
129, 136–37 (2d Cir 2010) (Straub J., dissenting) (noting confusion about which standards is proper).
One district judge has also criticized the use of this standard in qualified immunity cases. Peterson v.
Bernardi, 719 F. Supp. 2d 419, 429 n.9 (D.N.J. 2010) (“‘Arguable probable cause’ is a confusing
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In making this argument, then-judge Sotomayor noted that the Supreme
Court had “specifically criticized the conflation of an objective
reasonableness standard with a requirement of unanimous consensus” in
Williams.229
Moreover, like in the habeas context, the Supreme Court has often
elided the reasonableness prong of the qualified immunity inquiry with
the “clearly established law” prong. In several cases in which the Court
has found that the law was not clearly established, it has articulated the
reasonableness standard with the “all but the plainly incompetent”
officer formulation.230 The Court has similarly spoken of “general” and
“specific” legal rules in the constitutional tort context that might impact
the range of reasonable responses by defendant officers.231 In both
areas, it seems, the Court may squeeze the deference balloon on either
the application prong or the clearly established law prong, and achieve
the same result while muddying the standard. In the constitutional torts
context, however, there is at least one rationale for applying greater
deference when the correct application to the law is not obvious that
does not exist in habeas, namely, we do not expect police officers to
have the same expertise with applying the law that judges do.232
These reservations aside, the constitutional tort cases that apply a
construct, because it suggests that qualified immunity is available whenever fairminded officers may
disagree on the presence of probable cause.”). The issue of whether arguable probable cause comported
with the Supreme Court’s caselaw was squarely raised in a cert petition in the October 2013 term. Pet.
for Writ of Cert., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861 (2014) (No. 13-551) 2013 WL 5864010 (U.S.). The
Court ultimately reversed a finding of qualified immunity, but did not address the lower court’s analysis
of reasonableness. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 n.3 (2014) (per curiam).
229. Walcyzk, 496 F.3d at 170 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
230. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638
(1987); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“A Government official’s conduct
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right
[are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
accord id. (“[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”). Judge Reinhardt has criticized the Court’s recent jurisprudence, especially al-Kidd as erecting
insurmountable barriers for plaintiffs in the constitutional torts context similar to the barriers it has
erected for petitioners in the habeas context. See Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 124450.
231. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding that “general statements of the law
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning,” in “obvious” cases). Professor Stephen
Vladeck has written thoughtfully about the parallel between the application prong and the clearly
established law prong in habeas and constitutional tort law, and the “order of battle” in which courts
address the two elements. See Vladeck, supra note 12.
232. Because the qualification in AEDPA that clearly established law can only come from the
Supreme Court, however, police officers are ironically required to apply a great deal more law than state
courts in habeas cases, including circuit court decisions and even legal rules that have developed
through the consensus of district courts. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (noting clearly
established law in qualified immunity context can derive from “cases of controlling authority in the
[officers’] jurisdiction” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority”).
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reasonably competent officer standard suggest a framework where a
heightened reasonableness standard might be appropriate: where the
officers’ process and the division of functions between them and other
institutional actors, specifically a neutral magistrate, protect
constitutional rights ex ante. Our next and final task is to apply that
framework to habeas corpus law.
V. APPLICATION: A PROCESS-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
STATE COURT DECISIONS IN FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
Habeas law stands to benefit tremendously from a process-based
framework, in terms of both administrative ease and fairness (without
sacrificing comity). The ongoing problem of systemic violations of
state criminal defendants’ constitutional rights has been well
documented.233 I will not attempt an exhaustive review of these
deficiencies, nor will I attempt to prove their pervasiveness. Neither is
necessary in the framework this Article proposes. Instead, in a processbased habeas framework, the federal court can presume that the state is
co-equally committed to protecting constitutional rights, and may
consider its process for doing so in assessing whether the state’s
adjudication of the case is ultimately reasonable. I am not suggesting
that federal courts maintain a checklist of mandatory procedures, or that
the existence of any single procedure might outweigh the absence of
others. For example, as previously mentioned, AEDPA already
provides expedited timelines where states can establish that they furnish
capital defendants with adequate post-conviction counsel.234 But the
benefits of counsel would diminish drastically if counsel has insufficient
time or resources to investigate the case.235 How federal courts should
weigh these different procedures against one another in their holistic
assessment of the state process is a subject that warrants greater
attention, but it suffices now to put forward the following aspects of
state process as candidates for consideration:
A. The Provision of Post-conviction Counsel
At first glance, there would seem to be no analogue in habeas law to a
233. See, e.g., Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 16–23; see generally Stephen B.
Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE
L.J. 2150, 2171 (2013)..
234. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
235. See Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 759 (2008)
(“Representing a capital client is a labor-intensive, time-consuming undertaking; there are no
shortcuts.”).
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police officer’s application for a warrant to a neutral magistrate and the
benefits that “division of functions” creates. There is, however, an
additional player in the habeas context who serves a different but
perhaps comparable role in the adjudication of a prisoner’s
constitutional claims: post-conviction counsel. Counsel is guaranteed to
a defendant at trial and during the direct appeal,236 but not in postconviction proceedings. Many states provide post-conviction counsel in
capital cases, though some states leave this decision up to the discretion
of the trial court. 237 Scholars and advocates have long argued that the
complex procedural rules in state courts that determine what issues are
reviewable on federal habeas should require the states to provide an
attorney to indigent prisoners during post-conviction proceedings.238
While the Supreme Court has yet to recognize any such right to postconviction counsel emanating from the Constitution, it has recently
acknowledged that for some claims, such as ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, “a prisoner likely needs an attorney.”239
Let’s assume, however, that the Supreme Court will remain reluctant
to mandate the provision of counsel, or, may mandate it only in capital
cases. Federal courts could still incentivize state courts to appoint
counsel by considering whether counsel has been provided in its
reasonableness review.
Like the addition of the magistrate’s
independent judgment in the warrant context, post-conviction counsel
can assist the state court in fleshing out the constitutional issues through
investigation of the prisoner’s claims, adding specificity to the postconviction petition, and litigating issues in the trial and appellate courts.
A decision arrived at with the benefit of the assistance of counsel
therefore could be considered more reliable by the federal habeas
court.240
236. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
237. Alabama, for example, leaves the appointment of counsel up to the state post-conviction trial
court. Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a) (2014). See also Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective
Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of
Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 63–66 (2003) (reviewing states at time of publication that
provided postconviction counsel in capital cases).
238. See, e.g., Shay, supra note 187, at 488; Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in
Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101
(2013); Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 339, 353–56 (2006); see generally Am. Bar
Ass’n, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 79–92 (1990); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1866 (1994) (noting ability to present
postconviction claims depended on “sheer luck” of having pro bono counsel take on capital cases).
239. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012). See also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912
(2012).
240. Adequate counsel might also reduce the caseload in federal courts by persuading the state
court to grant habeas relief.
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To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that my proposal mandates the
appointment of counsel if states wish to have their decisions upheld on
federal habeas review. Any such mandate, while perhaps advisable,
would likely need to derive from the Constitution. Nor would the
provision of an attorney render the result of state court proceedings per
se objectively reasonable.241 Including the appointment of counsel as a
“reasonable step” a state court could take to obtain more deference from
the federal court instead charts a middle path: still limiting federal
review only to objectively unreasonable state court decisions, but
considering the division of functions between defense counsel and judge
as relevant to whether the adjudication is reasonable.
B. Access to an Evidentiary Hearing
Similar to the provision of counsel, state courts are often derelict in
providing evidentiary hearings to develop the factual basis for
postconviction petitioners’ claims.242 Such hearings have taken on
greater significance in the federal habeas context recently, however,
because of a decision of the Supreme Court issued the same day as
Richter. In Cullen v. Pinholster,243 the Court held that any facts that the
federal court considers in the § 2254(d) analysis must first be presented
to the state court.244 In other words, a federal court could not hold an
evidentiary hearing and then grant habeas relief based on new facts
adduced at that hearing—the facts are, in effect, frozen by the time the
case reaches federal court.
Accordingly, state post-conviction
proceedings are the last opportunity for habeas petitioners to develop
their claims. As Professor Kovarsky puts it, “the state habeas
proceeding is now the ball game.”245
Of course, whether to hold a hearing can be a complex question of
state law that requires an assessment of whether the state postconviction petition presents disputed issues of material fact.246
Importantly, under Pinholster, the federal court cannot consider what
evidence the petitioner would have put forward in the non-existent
hearing to determine whether the state court’s denial of a hearing was
241. Failure to provide adequate funding for counsel to present a case, for example, would render
the assistance of counsel illusory. See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
242. See Freedman, supra note 238, at 597. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent arguably
requires state courts to hold evidentiary hearings in order to give petitioners an opportunity to develop
such facts. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109
(1961).
243. 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011).
244. Id. at 1398.
245. Kovarsky, supra note 187.
246. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.9(a) (2014); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (2014).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/7

50

Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement: Judging Habeas Corpus

2015]

BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

1387

unreasonable. Nevertheless, the decision whether to hold a hearing can
be relevant to the federal court’s determination that the adjudication
involved a reasonable application of the law to the facts, since the state
court will have gone through the process of determining what the facts
are.247 Indeed, it makes good sense to defer to the state court’s decision
when, for example, it has conducted a fact-finding that includes
credibility determinations.248 Holding a hearing is plainly one of the
“reasonable steps” a state court can take in adjudicating a claim, and
therefore should be relevant to the objective reasonableness of its
decision.
C. Robust Review
Another important “division of functions” in the state courts is the
structure of its review of post-conviction claims. While all states have a
vertical appellate structure, it does not always mean robust review of a
petitioner’s claims at each level. In Alabama, for example, the trial
judge often simply signs the prosecutor’s proposed order denying postconviction relief, a practice disapproved by the appellate courts but not
heavily policed.249 An intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals then
reviews post-conviction appeals from the trial courts, but the Alabama
Supreme Court provides only discretionary review of a limited subset of
cases.250 While its review is somewhat more expansive in death penalty
cases,251 in practice it grants certiorari in very few, making fulsome
review in only one court the norm. In Oklahoma, a unitary appeal
structure requires defendants to challenge the effectiveness of their trial
attorneys on direct appeal.252 This presents two problems for petitioners
alleging this claim: they have little time or opportunity to conduct an
adequate investigation of their attorney’s deficiencies and, because
Oklahoma does not require new counsel on appeal, many defense
attorneys are left, as Professor Primus has noted, “in the untenable
position of having to raise their own ineffectiveness on appeal.”253 In
247. Failure to hold an evidentiary hearing or permit some other opportunity for a petitioner to
develop evidence may also be said to result in an unreasonable determination of the facts under
§ 2254(d)(2), see Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 765, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2014), or may indicate an “absence of
available State corrective process,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i).
248. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
249. See, e.g., Ex parte Jenkins, 105 So. 3d 1250, 1258–59 (Ala. 2012) (Petitioner failed to show
that trial court's order denying petition for postconviction relief was not product of trial court’s
independent judgment, and thus petitioner was not entitled to reversal of order within hours of receiving
it).
250. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(a)(1) (2014).
251. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(a)(2).
252. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, ch. 18, APP. R. 3.11(B)(3)(b) (2003).
253. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 19.
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California, funding for state habeas counsel is conditioned on filing
habeas petitions directly in the California Supreme Court, which can
summarily deny relief without a hearing and with no further appellate
review of the prisoner’s post-conviction claims.254 Federal courts can
rightly look to the division of functions between the state trial courts and
appellate courts in determining whether the adjudication of the
petitioner’s constitutional claims was reasonable.
D. Reasoned Statements
Finally, the reasoning of a state court decision is part of the process
the court goes through in adjudicating the claims, and therefore is a
proper subject for scrutiny by the federal court. This suggestion of
course runs into the major holding of Richter, which applies AEDPA
deference to summary denials.255 Even before Richter, some federal
courts were resistant to analyzing the reasoning of state court decisions,
with some derisively referring to this type of review as “grading
papers”256 (though even these courts acknowledged that “sound
reasoning will enhance the likelihood that a state court’s ruling will be
determined to be a ‘reasonable application’ of Supreme Court law” 257).
As described above, federal courts have split post-Richter on whether
they must concoct their own plausible reasons for a state court’s
decision when the state court does provide its own reasoning.258
The process-based framework to objective reasonableness charts a
middle path between ignoring the state court’s reasoning on the one
hand, and the insufficiently deferential “grading papers” approach on the
other. Whether or not the state court states its reasons, the federal court
still must uphold its decision if it is objectively reasonable , as Richter
hammers home. But the state court’s reasoning should be seen as a step
in that court’s process of adjudicating the federal claim, relevant to the
objective reasonableness analysis. It is a step that federal courts may
incentivize, if not mandate, consistently with AEDPA’s structure and
purpose. Indeed, where a state court provides sound reasoning for its
decision, it respects the state courts to rely on such reasoning rather than
to “impute a view to [the state] courts that they have never in fact
254. See SUPREME COURT POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF DEATH,
Policy 3, 2-1, at 5-6 (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/PoliciesMar2012.pdf.
255. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100 (2011).
256. See, e.g., Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are determining the
reasonableness of the state courts' ‘decision,’ not grading their papers.” (internal citation omitted); see
also Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 494–47 (discussing pre-Richter cases forswearing
scrutiny of state court’s reasoning).
257. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 86.
258. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying discussion.
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espoused,” as Judge Calabresi has put it.259 The explication of the state
court’s reasoning could prompt the federal court to apply a more
deferential standard of review in assessing objective reasonableness,
even while disagreeing with the ultimate result.
These are just a few aspects of state adjudicative process that a
federal court could examine to determine whether the results of that
process are reasonable. Courts could look to other factors as well.
The adequacy of funding of defense counsel at trial unquestionably
affects outcomes. It also may be worth considering whether the
state’s process for appointing or electing judges promotes judicial
independence,260 though these broader proposals cannot be fully
explored here.
E. Coda: Richter Under the Process-Based Framework
This Article has attempted to articulate a framework for judging the
reasonableness of state court decisions in habeas cases that takes into
account the state’s adjudicative process. It may seem somewhat pie-inthe-sky to suggest that federal courts adopt this framework given the
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence. Indeed, Richter itself stands as
a stark counterexample to the framework advocated here. Richter filed
his state post-conviction petition directly in the California Supreme
Court.261 Because the state supreme court issued a summary denial, no
evidentiary hearing was ever held so that Richter could develop his
claim.262 All the state court did was to issue its one-sentence summary
denial, and there was no further review.
Under the process-based framework, this decision should not have
been held to be reasonable based solely on the possibility of fairminded
disagreement. Admittedly, the Supreme Court found “ample basis” for

259. Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
260. Cf. James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign
Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727 (2011) (arguing that guarantee of due
process in state courts creates a compelling government interest in regulating spending in judicial
elections); Derek Willis, ‘Soft on Crime’ TV Ads Affect Judges’ Decisions, Not Just Elections, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/upshot/soft-on-crime-tv-ads-affect-judgesdecisions-not-just-elections.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1;
see
also
OATH,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDxs_Qt4Gyg (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (TV ad supporting
retention of three justices of Tennessee Supreme Court, stating that they faithfully followed their oath to
uphold state constitution because they affirmed “nearly 90% of death sentences”); see also Fletcher,
supra note 38, at 820-21 (describing 1986 election for California Supreme Court, in which challengers
ran on platform of increasing use of death penalty, and noting that before election, 40% of cases were
reversed due to constitutional error, while after election, 3.8% were reversed).
261. In re Joshua Richter on Habeas Corpus, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1946 (Cal. Mar. 28 2001).
262. See Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46, at 487.
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the state court’s decision in Richter,263 suggesting that it was not a close
case in which the existence of fairminded disagreement would be a
necessary tie-breaker in favor of the respondent. In such a case, it is
likely that the state court decision would not rise to the level of objective
unreasonableness under Williams, making any alterations to AEDPA
standard in Richter dicta. Still, under the process-based framework,
Richter should not have applied a heightened standard.
Despite the inappropriateness of applying a fairminded disagreement
standard in a case like Richter, however, the standard has now been
repeated in numerous Supreme Court opinions and is, for better or
worse, part of habeas doctrine. Therefore, we must reconcile it with the
fact that the Court has never indicated a desire to overturn Williams or
otherwise supplant objective reasonableness as the touchstone for all
habeas cases. This Article proposes reconciliation under a framework
that takes state adjudicative process into account. In the absence of such
a framework, we will continue to see confusion around the fairminded
disagreement standard in the federal courts, and habeas corpus relief
will become increasingly difficult to obtain, including in cases where
justice demands it.
VI. CONCLUSION

Like other creatures that rise from the dead, the return of the
fairminded disagreement standard to habeas law is an unwelcome
development. This Article has attempted to clear up the confusion
occasioned by its revivification. The new standard cannot mean that
subjectivism has returned to habeas review. Nor can fairminded
disagreement on its own suffice to deny habeas relief. Instead, courts
should adopt a framework for analyzing reasonableness that takes into
account the state courts’ adjudicative process. This framework is
consistent with the “common,” “familiar” understanding of
reasonableness from other areas of law. It also provides flexibility and
calibrates the level of federal deference to the steps the state court takes.
The process-based framework leaves room for the states to develop their
own procedures, thereby advancing the federalism and comity principles
underlying AEDPA, while not abdicating the federal courts’ obligation
to protect against “extreme malfunctions” in individual cases.264 And it
incentivizes state courts to “conduct their proceedings in a manner
consistent with established constitutional standards,”265 thereby
enhancing the role of both state and federal courts as guardians of
263. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
264. Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constitutional rights. Such a framework is especially needed now, as
some states have begun to consider measures that would speed up their
capital appeals, and thereby reduce state process in cases where the
petitioner faces the death penalty. 266 If federal courts must simply
ignore these reductions in due process in cases where it is most needed
because fairminded jurists could disagree about the results, then the
“double security” provided by the Great Writ has diminished indeed.267
Critics of AEDPA may object to any attempt to build a model for
federal review that includes a standard that, in their view, is overly
deferential to state courts, overly hostile to claims of prisoners, and
ultimately unjust.268 Other commentators may object on the ground that
the standard for federal habeas relief should be essentially
insurmountable.269 On these political questions, reasonable people can
surely disagree. But habeas doctrine now includes two standards that, as
I have shown, are in troubling tension with one another. This Article
has tried to break through that tension and propose a way forward. By
looking to other areas of law that employ standards of objective
reasonableness, courts can take process into account in habeas law and
get back to the familiar business of deciding what’s reasonable, rather
than who’s reasonable.

266. In the 2013-2014 legislative term, Alabama and Kansas considered bills that would have
significantly reduced the time allotted for filing a state postconviction petition in such cases and
imposed time limits on state courts to decide postconviction cases. Stephanie Taylor, Legislators,
Defense Attorneys at Odds Over Proposed Changes to Alabama's Death Penalty Laws, TUSCALOOSA
NEWS,
(Jan.
25,
2014),
http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20140125/NEWS/140129834?tc=ar#gsc.tab=0; Bill Would
Limit Death Penalty Appeal Time, KAKE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.kake.com/home/headlines/Billwould-limit-death-penalty-appeal-time-248538041.html. Florida passed the “Timely Justice Act” in
2013, which fast-tracks cases where appeals have run out toward execution. See Capital Punishment –
Timely Justice Act, 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2013-216, §12 (West). Habeas practitioners have
argued this law severely curtails the possibility of bringing meritorious successive habeas petitions. See
Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 538–42 (Fla. 2014) (disagreeing that any such curtailment rises to the
level of a constitutional violation).
267. Freedman, Post-Conviction Remedies, supra note 20, at 298.
268. See, e.g., Ritter, Voice of Reason, supra note 7, at 86 (“Legal standards are mere words, and
applying them is never a simple matter. Nonetheless, that is no excuse for choosing a standard like the
fair-minded jurist test that virtually guarantees the denial of even the most legitimate claims.”).
269. See, e.g., Daniel J. O’Brien, Heeding Congress’s Message: The United States Supreme Court
Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief Against All but Irrational State Court Decisions, and
Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 319, 320, 322 (2002) (arguing that Richter properly
emphasized that federal habeas courts should rarely, if ever, overturn state convictions).
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